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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This study examines the differential impact of illegal insider trading on liquidity in the alternative 
market structures of the NYSE (specialist), NASDAQ (dealer), and the CBOE (hybrid).  Using US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) prosecuted insider trades, we investigate changes in 
bid ask spread measures.  This study contributes to, and extends, the literature on insider trading in 
several ways.  Firstly, by specifically examining SEC prosecuted insider trading cases, this thesis 
utilises a direct measure of informed trading and adverse selection risk.  Secondly, literature in the 
field has mainly focused on event studies.  This is the first study to examine the impact of illegal 
insider trading on liquidity in a cross-sectional framework.  Thirdly, it is also the first study to 
examine the impact of illegal insider trading on the liquidity of option contracts, in addition to 
investigating the relationship between informed trading in the options and underlying stock of a 
company.  Finally, since the identification of informed traders by market makers is dependent on 
the implicit trader anonymity built in to the alternative market structures, this study also contributes 
to literature on trader anonymity, by examining the level of trader anonymity - the extent to which a 
trader is recognized as informed – afforded to illegal insider traders on each market. 
 
Results indicate that bid ask spreads are greater on the NYSE on insider trading days, but narrower 
or unchanged on NASDAQ, which suggests that the specialist system offers less trader anonymity 
than the competitive dealer system.  However, our cross-sectional regressions reveal that it is the 
trade characteristics of the informed trades which possibly signal the presence of informed traders 
to market makers.  In addition we also find that paired option trades of NASDAQ underlying stocks 
experience an improvement in liquidity, while NYSE underlying stock options experience no 
significant change.  These findings suggest that the hybrid market structure is in fact fragmented 
like the NASDAQ dealer system and offers greater trader anonymity than the NYSE specialist 
system.  Furthermore, we find that the main determinant of option spreads is the quoted spreads of 
the underlying stocks, which lend further support to Cho and Engle’s (1998) derivative hedge 
theory. 
 CHAPTER 1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Recently markets across the globe have been in a phase of consolidation, with the consolidation of 
the NYSE with Euronext, the LSE with Borsa Italiana, and even the 5% stake of the NYSE in the 
emerging market of the National Stock Exchange of India.  This has also seen the proliferation of 
new markets and different trading systems.  Although new market structures such as automated 
order matching systems and electronic communication networks have gained much popularity, 
many still maintain that the traditional market structures of the NYSE (specialist) and NASDAQ 
(competitive dealer system) represent ideal market structures for efficient price discovery and 
effective liquidity provision (Venkataraman & Waisburd, 2007; Demsetz, 1968). In market 
microstructure literature, the impact of informed trading on liquidity in specialist and dealer markets 
have been examined in detail through theoretical models and empirical analysis.  However, the 
findings empirically are conflicting. 
 
In addition, the unique nature of the hybrid market structure of the CBOE which superimposes a 
specialist among an existing competitive market making structure has not been examined in 
comparison to the traditional specialist or dealer markets1.  Furthermore, the recent identification 
and subsequent prosecution of illegal insider trading syndicates2 and hedge funds3 that earned 
profits running into the millions generates an important regulatory and market design debate, as to 
                                                 
1 Kalok Chan, Y. Peter Chung, Herb Johnson, 1995, The Intraday Behavior of Bid-Ask Spreads for NYSE Stocks and CBOE Options, The Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 329 -346  
2  SEC v. Sonja Anticevic, et al., Lit. Release No. 19775, Civ. Action No. 05 Civ. 6991 (KMW) (S.D.N.Y., fourth amended complaint filed 
July 26, 2006)  
3  SEC v. Deephaven Capital Management, LLC and Bruce Lieberman, Lit. Release No. 19683, Civ. Action No. 01:06CV00805 (D.D.C. 
May 2, 2006); SEC v. Langley Partners, L.P., et al., Lit. Release No. 19607, Civ. Action No. 1:06CV00467 (JDB) (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2006); SEC v. 
Hilary Shane, Lit. Release No. 19227, Civ. Action No. 05-civ-4772 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2005); see also SEC v. Guillaume Pollet, Lit. Release No. 
19199, Civ. Action No. 05-CV-1937 (SLT/RLM) (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2005) (charging former managing director of investment bank, SG Cowen & 
Co., with insider trading ahead of stock offering). 
how markets should be organized and regulated in order to best deal with the trades of those with 
insider information. 
 
In this study we aim to test whether an anonymous electronic screen-based market such as 
NASDAQ, or alternatively an auction market such as the NYSE, where the execution of the entire 
order flow is facilitated through one specialist on the exchange floor, or further a hybrid market 
structure that incorporates both competitive market makers and a specialist (CBOE), identify 
information-motivated traders more effectively.  Whether one type of market making structure is 
better suited to the identification of informed traders compared to another is important for market 
design and regulatory purposes.  Essentially market designers are concerned with the problem of 
information asymmetry; either too much or too little can be detrimental to a market.  If the market 
structure is fully transparent and reveals the presence of informed traders, the price discovery 
process would deteriorate, as traders only engage in costly information gathering activities if they 
are able to profit from trading on that information. Their trading activity therefore makes prices 
informative and markets efficient.  In contrast, if informed traders are able to remain fully 
anonymous, market liquidity is reduced because uninformed market participants do not want to lose 
to informed traders.  The different rules and market structures on exchanges impose varying levels 
of anonymity in alternative markets. 
 
Regulators are concerned with the level of information-based trading permissible in a particular 
market, as they are concerned with trading costs and liquidity.  Since it is the trading arrangements 
in a market that determine the level of trader anonymity afforded to market participants, market 
structure, trading costs, and liquidity are seen to be related.  An important measure of trading costs 
and liquidity is the bid-ask spread and regulators are interested in knowing whether differences in 
spreads across markets are related to varying levels of information asymmetry on each market.4 
                                                 
4
  Heidle, H.G., Huang, R.D., 2002. Information-based trading in dealer and auction markets: an analysis of exchange listings. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 37 (3), 391–424. 
 We specifically examine the trades of illegal insiders who traded in both the options (on the CBOE) 
and the underlying stock (on either NYSE or NASDAQ) of a company on the same day, based on 
the same information.  The unique nature of the trades made by the insiders in the options and stock 
of a company in different exchanges allows us to examine the differential impact of illegal insider 
trading on liquidity on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and CBOE. 
 
Adverse selection models predict that bid-ask spreads should be affected by information 
asymmetry.  Since the options listed on the CBOE are derivative securities, it is expected that when 
the same insiders trade on both the options and the underlying at the same time based on the same 
information, that the market makers in both markets would face the same level of adverse selection.  
However, the CBOE has a different market making structure to both the NYSE and NASDAQ and 
hence offers a different level of trader anonymity. This may lead to differential liquidity effects on 
the options market and the underlying in response to the illegal insider trading. The results would 
hence allow us to investigate which market marking structure is best able to identify these informed 
trades and therefore can aid in the design of markets which are more effective in dealing with illegal 
insider trading. 
 
The study contributes to the existing literature in several ways.  Firstly, by specifically looking at 
US Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) prosecuted insider trading cases, we utilise a direct 
measure of informed trading and adverse selection risk.  Secondly, literature in the field has mainly 
focused on event studies relating to single prosecuted cases of insider trading such as Fishe and 
Robe (2004), Cornell & Sirri (1992), and Chakravarty & McConnell (1999), apart from the 
exception of Meulbroek (1992), who looks at a cross-section of cases.  This is the first study to 
examine the impact of illegal insider trading on liquidity in a cross-sectional framework, using SEC 
prosecuted illegal insider trades that span from 1998 to 2007.  Thirdly, it is also the first study to 
examine the impact of illegal insider trading on the liquidity of option contracts, in addition to 
investigating the relationship between informed trading in the options and underlying stock of a 
company. 
 
Our study is similar to that of Fishe and Robe (2004), as it concerns illegal insider trading and its 
effect on liquidity.  However, we examine a larger sample on a cross-sectional basis (more than one 
SEC case), utilising the simple methodology of Garfinkel and Nimalendran (2003).  Whereas Fishe 
and Robe (2004) carry out cross-sectional regressions on the trades of brokers stemming from one 
SEC case based on the same information announcement type (Inside Wall Street recommendations), 
we compare the cross-sectional reaction of market makers on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and CBOE 
between a control period and the insider trading day, across a range of SEC cases and 
announcement types.  In addition, we also examine the level of trader anonymity in each market, 
similar to Garfinkel and Nimalendran (2003), using illegal insider trades as a proxy for informed 
trading in contrast to the legal trades of corporate insiders used in the original study.  Finally, we 
investigate the impact of insider trading on bid ask spreads in a multivariate framework by 
estimating cross-sectional regressions that control for trading activity, price volatility, and the 
stock/contract price level.  Therefore findings from this study will contribute to the debate on illegal 
insider trading, trading costs, and market structure.  Furthermore, the results will be of great 
assistance to market regulators and designers in understanding how market makers identify and 
react to illegal insider trading 
 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the institutional details for 
the NYSE, NASDAQ, and CBOE market structures. Chapter 3 provides a review of theoretical and 
empirical work examining the differential impact of informed trading on liquidity in different 
market structures and literature on trader anonymity. This is followed in Chapter 4 by the 
hypothesis development. Chapter 5 outlines the data and research methodology employed in this 
study. Chapter 6 presents the results and Chapter 7 provides conclusions with suggestions for 
possible areas of future research. 
 
 CHAPTER 2 
 
2. Institutional Background 
 
2.1 The NYSE 
 
The NYSE is organized as a specialist system (Garfinkel and Nimalendran, 2003).  The role of the 
specialist is specifically to maintain a fair and orderly market in the stocks assigned to them5.  This 
is achieved by maintaining two-sided quotes for the stocks in which they specialize.  Specialists 
perform their duties within the bounds of their affirmative obligations to “deal...for [their] own 
account when lack of price continuity, lack of depth, or disparity between supply and demand exists 
or is reasonably to be anticipated”10.  In addition they are also subject to negative obligations where 
rules of price and time priority apply, and the specialist may not trade ahead of a limit order at the 
same or better price.  The specialist disseminates a quote and a market depth on the basis of the 
orders on the book and his own position and preferences.  Currently the specialist is required to 
disseminate the quotes of the best limit orders unless their own quotes are more competitive. 
 
The NYSE is organized so that all orders in a security go to one particular floor location where 
members trading that security gather. The specialist trades only the securities assigned to that 
location. Other individuals, floor brokers, might trade securities at several locations but usually 
handle all of their brokerage firm’s orders in a particular security.  Orders are either submitted 
electronically over the Super Designated Order Turnaround (SuperDOT) system (more than 90% of 
orders6) or are handled by floor brokers in the ‘crowd’ that aim for best execution.  Although orders 
are routed through an automated system, execution of trades is not automated as on electronic 
order-matching systems.  Incoming market orders are usually revealed to the whole market, 
whereupon other traders or the specialist have the choice of improving the price provided to the 
                                                 
5  NYSE Guide, NYSE Rule 104.10(2). 
6
  Market Structure Report of the New York Stock Exchange, Special Committee on Market Structure, Governance and Ownership. 
order, otherwise it is executed at the best posted bid/ask quote.  The NYSE specialists serve as 
agents in the crowd for all of the “system” orders posted to the specialists via SuperDOT as well as 
orders entrusted to them by floor brokers11.  The NYSE specialist also has the freedom to send 
orders to a regional exchange for execution, through the electronic Intermarket Trading System 
(ITS). 
 
On the NYSE the vast majority of orders are executed against the orders of other customers on an 
agency basis. Orders represented in the crowd do not trade with the specialist when the crowd itself 
is supplying sufficient liquidity.   This contrasts with that of a dealer market, such as NASDAQ, in 
which investor orders usually do not directly interact with each other.  Instead, the vast majority of 
NASDAQ orders execute against the account of a dealer acting as a market maker.  It is argued that 
since the intervention of a dealer involves an additional spread between the prices at which 
investors can buy and sell, it is likely that in many instances investors obtain less favourable prices 
on their trades than if they could trade with other investors. 
 
2.2 The NASDAQ 
 
The NASDAQ is a hybrid quote driven dealer market, where the dealers must continuously post 
firm prices at which they will trade.  Theses bid-ask quotes of competing dealers are electronically 
disseminated to brokers and bulletin boards.  There can be a number of dealers for a given stock, 
with some active stocks exceeding 30 to even 60 dealers.  As part of the exchange obligations, a 
dealer in an active stock is obligated to trade 1,000 shares at the posted quote7.  Market orders that 
arrive are executed at the ‘inside quote’ which is the best posted bid/ask quote among all dealers. 
Limit orders are not exposed to the rest of the market and are not executed against incoming market 
orders. Limit orders, like market orders, execute against the dealer’s quote and must wait until the 
quote reaches the limit price.  The SEC initiated order handling rules stipulate that dealers cannot 
                                                 
7
 Huang, R. D., and H. R. Stoll, 1996, “Dealer versus Auction Markets: A Paired Comparison of Execution Costs on NASDAQ and the 
NYSE.” Journal of Financial Economics, 41, 313-357. 
trade ahead of their own customer limit orders, or those customer orders left with him by a broker.  
Hence customer limit orders with a dealer must first execute if they are at a more competitive or 
equal price before the dealer can trade on their account.  Hence a market maker is required to 
handle a marketable limit order in one of four ways: (1) execute the limit order; (2) change its quote 
and the size associated with its quote to reflect the limit order; (3) send the limit order to another 
market maker; (4) deliver a limit order to an electronic communications network (“ECN”) or 
unlisted trading privileges market (“UTP”)8. 
 
On the NASDAQ much of the customer order flow is redirected to ‘preferenced’ dealers with 
whom brokers have a guarantee of execution at the best inside quote, sometimes in return for 
incentives.  Or orders are ‘internalized’, where a broker-dealer executes the order by trading on his 
own account.  In both these cases, rules of the exchange such as rules of ‘best execution’ apply, 
which stipulate that the orders cannot execute at price worse than the insider quote on the 
NASDAQ system. 
 
In addition to the market makers, the NASDAQ network also connects to and utilises alternative 
trading systems into the market, such as electronic communication networks (ECNs) which 
accounted for approximately 40% of volume in 200111. ECNs provide electronic facilities that 
investors can use to trade directly with each other. As NASDAQ market participants, ECNs display 
either one-sided or two-sided quotes that reflect actual orders.  They also provide investors with an 
anonymous way to enter orders into the marketplace.  However, unlike market makers, ECNs 
operate simply as order-matching mechanisms and do not maintain inventories of their own. 
 
With the onset of ECNs, the NASDAQ also introduced The Super-Montage in 2002, an electronic 
book which included multiple levels of liquidity from market makers and ECNs and not just the top 
                                                 
8
  Mizrach, Bruce, 2006, "The Next Tick on Nasdaq: Does Level II Information Matter?". Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=312159 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.312159 
quote. This enables the public to view the demand and supply curves of all market participants.  
NASDAQ also introduced an anonymous quote and execution facility which appears in the order 
book under the identity SIZE11.  Even though trading remains fragmented on NASDAQ, the limit 
order book still provides a centralized view of nearly all the available liquidity. 
 
2.3 The CBOE 
 
The Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) was initially established with an open-outcry 
"trading crowd" structure modelled on the trading mechanism used in futures pits. However, by 
1999 the CBOE had approved plans to assign a "Designated Primary Marketmaker" (DPM) similar 
to a specialist system, over the existing competitive market making structure with a floor trading 
crowd for all equity options.  Both before and after the system change, orders away from the best 
prices were not revealed to members.  
 
Prior to this change, all options on the CBOE traded under a multiple market maker system with an 
exchange employee known as the Order Book Official (OBO) maintaining the limit order book. The 
OBO was responsible for entering orders into the limit order book and disseminating the best bid 
and ask quotes from the book to the trading crowd. The trading crowd was composed of floor 
brokers and market makers. A member of the exchange could serve as a broker and a market maker, 
but not on the same day.  This trading crowd provided liquidity in equity options on the CBOE.  
Only the inside bid and ask were revealed to the trading crowd by the OBO. 
 
Each option class is assigned to a particular DPM who now maintains the limit order book and has 
complete and exclusive knowledge of it. The DPM has the privilege of acting as both a broker and 
dealer on the same day. The DPM is also guaranteed a portion of the order flow in the assigned 
options in return for maintaining an orderly market in the assigned options. If the DPM’s quote is 
the first to set the best standing quote then they can execute the full amount of the incoming order 
flow. However, even when the DPM does not have time priority but matches the best quote, they 
are entitled to a pro rata share of the order flow.  All equity options listed on the CBOE have a 
DPM.9 
 
On June 12, 2003, the CBOE launched CBO Edirect HyTS, a system for access to both screen-
based and floor-based trading environments.  The CBOE also operates the Retail Automated 
Execution System (RAES), and automated execution facility which offers faster trading for 
qualifying orders (from retail customers for less than 50 contracts).  When a market order or a 
marketable limit order that can be filled at the current market price is entered into RAES, the order 
is simply matched with the prevailing quoted price and is assigned to a market maker to take the 
other side.  Thus, executing the order does not involve floor brokers and the trade is largely 
anonymous. 
 
It is worth noting that on the CBOE the market makers are bound by affirmative obligations by the 
exchange to offer meaningful quotes unlike on the CBOT.  Ferguson and Mann (2001) find that the 
absence of market-making obligations allows locals to act less than fully competitively. Therefore 
the market making structure of the CBOE with the DPM and competitive market makers is quite 
unique, in that it incorporates the competitive dealer system of the NASDAQ with market maker 
obligations, with the specialist system of the NYSE who is also obligated to offer and manage 
liquidity.  However, only the DPM or specialist has the informational advantage of knowing the 
whole limit order book and observing order flow.  Therefore this is the first time that the merits of 
the CBOE hybrid system will be compared to those of the traditional specialist (NYSE) and 
competitive dealer (NASDAQ) systems to determine whether such a hybrid does provide 
improvement beyond the traditional structures especially in dealing with insider trading. 
 
                                                 
9   Amber Ananda, Daniel G. Weaver, The value of the specialist: Empirical evidence from the CBOE 
Although close to 70% (60/89) of all the options trades that we analyse in this study were executed 
on the CBOE, the remaining 30% were executed on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), the 
Pacific Exchange (PCX), or the Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX). All four of the markets are 
floor-based hybrid markets.  Battalio, Hatch, Jennings (2004) argue that they are all in fact the same 
market structure,  as all of these floor-based exchanges have exchange-determined designated 
primary market makers (or lead market makers on the PCX) acting as specialists, who trade on their 
own accounts, disseminate quotes, and provide liquidity. In addition to the specialists, these 
exchanges also use registered option market makers to supplement liquidity. Registered option 
market makers also trade on their own accounts and have affirmative obligations to make markets. 
As noted by Mayhew (2002), these mechanisms resemble the open outcry structure for actively 
traded options.  As we are only interested in examining the effect of market structure, we conclude 
that all options trades in our data set were executed on the one type of hybrid market structure, and 
here on refer to all four options markets generally as the CBOE.10 
                                                 
10 The AMEX and PHLX always traded under the hybrid floor based market structure.  However, the CBOE initially 
introduced the ‘Modified Trading System’ market structure in 1987 for some stocks and eventually moved to list all 
options under a ‘Designated Primary Market Maker’ by 1999.  The Pacific Exchange introduced a similar program 
in 1991. 
 CHAPTER 3 
 
3. Literature Review 
 
Illegal insider trading and its impact on liquidity in different market structures has become an 
important issue to market designers, exchanges, and regulators in the past decade as markets around 
the world have moved to deter insider trading and increase liquidity.  Theoretically, the traditional 
market structures of the NYSE and NASDAQ has been closely examined, and have found that the 
specialist NYSE system is more effective in dealing with informed trading than the NASDAQ 
dealer system (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Glosten, 1989; Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm, 
1992; Leach and Madhavan, 1993).  However, empirical results are conflicting when examining 
informed trading using myriad of proxies such as legal corporate insider trades, illegal SEC 
prosecuted insider trades, and institutional holdings.  Further, trader anonymity and market 
transparency have also contributed to the literature on informed trading and its impact on liquidity.  
Therefore as the focus of this study is to examine the differential liquidity effects of illegal insider 
trading in the specialist, dealer, and hybrid market structures, we review theoretical literature on 
market structure and informed trading, empirical literature on insider trading and it effect on 
liquidity, and finally empirical literature on differential trader anonymity in different markets and its 
effect on the impact of informed trading. 
 
 
3.1 Theoretical Findings on Informed Trading and its Impact on Liquidity in Specialist 
and Competitive Market Making Systems 
 
 
A concern of exchanges is the extent to which traders should be allowed to exploit their private 
information. The impounding of new information into equity prices when investors trade on private 
information, and the speed of this process determines the efficiency of a market.  To encourage 
market efficiency, informed traders must have an incentive to profit from their private information 
in order to account for the costs of information gathering.  As stated earlier, informed trading is 
essential for efficient markets, however too much informational asymmetry would destroy a market.  
Uninformed traders do not want to lose to informed traders and trading activity is negatively 
impacted when the adverse selection problem becomes prevalent. There is also the paradox noted 
by Grossman (1976) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). If markets were truly informationally 
efficient in the sense that equilibrium prices are fully revealing, the incentive to gather costly 
information would disappear. How then can the markets be efficient?   The NYSE, NASDAQ and 
CBOE implicitly have different market mechanisms for dealing with informed trading which result 
in differential liquidity effects on each market.  
 
In an auction market such as the NYSE, the specialist is given access to the information on the 
entire order book in return for abiding by their affirmative obligations.  This access to information 
about the order book is cited as the reason why an auction market can remain liquid in the presence 
of informed trading.  Glosten and Milgrom (1985) reason that the specialist is willing to trade with 
informed traders as they are able to offset the losses with subsequent gains from uninformed 
traders.  In addition, Glosten (1989) suggests that the averaging process of gains and losses across 
trades occurs both through time and also at one point in time over different quantities of a price 
schedule, further enhancing the market resiliency. Therefore when faced with the problem of 
adverse selection, the specialist is still able to maintain a liquid market by cross-subsidizing 
unprofitable informed trades with uninformed trades. 
 
Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992) offer an alternative explanation for why specialist market 
structures reduce the adverse selection problem. They suggest that the repeated dealings between 
floor brokers and specialists on the NYSE lead to truth telling by floor brokers when the trader is 
believed to be informed due to ex-post benefits for the floor broker in subsequent dealings with the 
specialist.  On the contrary, not informing the specialist may also include ex-post sanctions from the 
specialist.  These sanctions may take the form of not providing better trade prices, refusing to fill 
orders above the quoted depth, or unwillingness to help “work” a large order.  The resulting 
equilibrium outcome is one where all parties are better off since the specialist is able to post a 
narrower bid-ask spread that benefits all by attracting discretionary liquidity traders.   
 
Chan and Weinstein (1993) reach similar conclusions.  They argue that due to the repeated dealings 
between floor brokers and the specialist, a reputation is built on which brokers that reveal private 
information regarding their trading clients are rewarded by the specialist offering them tighter bid–
ask spreads on future trades and  information about standing orders.  However, they highlight that 
the transfer of the private information regarding the informed nature of traders must have some 
noise, as if informed traders are perfectly identified then they would no longer trade and prices 
would cease to be informative. 
 
This unique role of reputation in the interaction between specialists and floor brokers on the NYSE 
is empirically examined by Battalio, Ellul and Jennings (2007).  They examine instances in which 
NYSE stocks experience trading floor relocations, where the specialists follow the stock but a great 
number of brokers do not.  Therefore, in the case of relocating stocks, the specialist is no longer 
familiar with the new trading crowd and incoming floor brokers.  This allows them to test the 
theory suggesting that reputations allow non-anonymous markets to attenuate adverse selection in 
trading.   Using NYSE trade and quote data, they examine spreads around the time the securities 
relocate on the NYSE floor.  They find an increase in liquidity costs for the stocks that relocated. 
Consistent with theory, the rise in trading costs is positively related to the measured adverse 
selection and to the broker turnover associated with the relocated stock. They also examine the 
trading costs of individual brokers who move with the specialist to the new location, and those 
broker who newly arrive.  Their results indicate that trading costs paid by moving brokers are lower 
than those paid by the brokers that are new to the trading crowd. This result is especially strong in 
the first few days after the move.  Battalio, Ellul and Jennings (2007) conclude that reputation plays 
an important role in the NYSE’s liquidity provision process. 
 
Garfinkel and Nimalendran (2003) highlight that the aforementioned theories can still apply in the 
current NYSE structure.  Despite over 90% of orders being submitted via the SuperDOT system 
which are not actually handled by floor brokers, 65% of the volume is still actually channelled 
through the floor brokers11.  This points to the fact that most of the order handled through the 
SuperDOT system are small trades, which are usually unlikely to be informed anyway (Barclay and 
Warner, 1993; Chakravarty, 2001), while large volume trades are handled by floor brokers. 
 
Leach and Madhavan (1993) also study the behaviour of market makers on the NYSE and 
NASDAQ.  They examine a model where liquidity demands are price elastic and order flow is 
endogenous.  They argue that if these two assumptions hold then it is possible for the market maker 
to affect the order flow with his price quotations.  For example, widening the bid-ask spread would 
reduce the fraction of expected volume originating from noise traders, thereby making the observed 
order flow more informative.  This kind of behaviour by the market maker is termed as ‘price 
experimentation’.  The authors propose that a specialist can take part in price experimentation by 
quoting prices that induce costly informed trading, as they are able to recoup the losses in later 
periods.  However, dealers are unwilling to engage in price experimentation at their own cost due to 
the free rider problem associated with other dealers being able to deduce the information by 
observing trade history.  This cost arises from the liquidity orders forgone when widening spreads 
to induce more informed order flow.  Consistent with Glosten (1989), Leach and Madhavan’s 
model provides a rationale for a specialist market remaining open during informed trading when a 
multiple dealer market would simply close down.  This is because the monopolistic specialist can 
offset the losses to informed traders with future gains from trading with more precise knowledge. 
                                                 
11
 Garfinkel, J.A., and M. Nimalendran, 2003, Market Structure and Trader Anonymity: An Analysis of Insider Trading, The Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 591-610. 
Leach and Madhavan analyse the effect of price experimentation on the bid-ask spread and provide 
an exploratory analysis of specialist intraday data and that is consistent with their price 
experimentation hypothesis. 
 
Further, the models of Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Easley and O’Hara (1987), and Kyle (1985) 
suggest that market makers infer the presence of the insider from total order flow.  This theory 
would support the arguments in favour of the specialist system in dealing with informed trading as 
all trades are facilitated by the specialist who has full knowledge of order flow and can assess the 
presence of informed traders.  Similarly, Saar (2001) also predicts that a specialist system will have 
lower spreads because the specialist’s knowledge of the limit order book reduces uncertainty about 
investor demand. 
 
In contrast to the specialist system, several attributes of the competing dealer market make it more 
difficult to identify informed traders and hence harder to remain liquid in times of high information 
asymmetry. NASDAQ is an anonymous electronic screen-based system, which leads to greater 
trader anonymity and increased adverse selection.  In contrast to the NYSE specialist who sees the 
entire order flow, all dealers have equal access to the market and they see only their portion of the 
order flow.  Also due to the fact that on the NYSE all order flow goes through one specialist, quotes 
can be adjusted after each trade.  However in a dealer market, one informed trader can 
simultaneously trade with different dealers before quotes are adjusted.  Heidle and Huang (2002) 
argue that if dealers are unable to segregate the informed traders from the liquidity traders, the 
resulting pooling equilibrium is one where bid-ask spreads are wider than in an environment where 
the institutional design permits the segregation of the two parties.  In addition the introduction of 
Limit Order Handling Rules, which require dealers to reflect customer limit orders in their quotes 
may have also had the effect of promoting informed trading by providing free-trading options with 
customer limit orders and by attracting additional liquidity traders with the narrower spreads 
generated by smaller tick sizes.   
 
However, institutional traders are often said to prefer an anonymous environment because they do 
not want to publicly disclose their trading needs (Economides and Schwartz, 1995; Schwartz and 
Steil, 1996), which is an advantage of the NASDAQ market structure as it reduces such problems as 
front running.  This highlights the problem of achieving a balance in market transparency and trader 
anonymity and adverse selection costs in the design of a market. 
 
 
3.2 Insider Trading and its Impact on Liquidity in Specialist and Competitive Market 
Making Systems 
 
The seminal paper on illegal insider trading by Meulbroek (1992) finds evidence that the price 
revisions on insider trading days by market makers is dependent on other trade characteristics apart 
from insider volume.  Unfortunately, due to the unavailability of time stamps and transaction size 
data in her study she could not conduct a detailed transaction level analysis examining insider 
trading and its effect on market liquidity.  More recent literature on illegal insider trading and its 
effect on market liquidity have provided somewhat conflicting results. Fishe & Robe (2004) 
examine insider trading data stemming from a single Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
case and find that during periods of insider trading, market makers decrease depth more so on the 
NYSE and AMEX than NASDAQ, and that spreads widen on the NYSE and AMEX but not the 
NASDAQ.  Concluding that specialist markets are better at detecting informed trades, and remain 
liquid in times of information asymmetry.  Their results are consistent with the Stoll (1978) 
hypothesis that a specialist system allows for the identification of informed traders more effectively 
than a multiple market maker system. 
 
However, Cornell and Sirri (1992) also examine the illegal insider trades of a single insider and his 
tippees surrounding the takeover announcement of Campbell Taggart and find that insider traders 
relative to non-insiders paid both lower fixed costs of trading as well as lower market impact cost 
on the NYSE.  In terms of spreads they observe no real pattern when examining weekly and 
monthly mean estimated bid-ask spreads for Campbell Taggart, including the month the insiders 
traded.  They postulate that market liquidity, measured by bid ask spreads, actually rose during 
insider trading because increased speculative interest from uninformed traders allowed market 
makers to better match trades between insiders and noise traders rather than bear the risk of being 
on the wrong side of an informed trade, directly contradicting the adverse selection model.  Their 
results are in direct contrast to Fishe & Robe’s finding that specialist markets (i.e. the NYSE) are 
better able to detect insider trading and adjust spreads.   
 
These results are again replicated in the study by Chakravarty and McConnell (1999), who find that 
Ivan Boesky’s trades in the NYSE listed Carnation’s stock on the basis of illegally obtained insider 
information prior to a takeover announcement had no significant negative effect on liquidity, as 
spreads remained unaffected while bid and ask depths were either unaffected or improved by his 
trades.  They conclude that "insider trading appears to facilitate price discovery and to have no 
adverse effect on market liquidity."  However, they also suggest that "[e]ven if bid-ask spreads do 
not widen in immediate response to particular instances of insider trading, spreads may widen 
generally because insider trading decreases the profits of market makers over time." 
 
A recent work exploring the determinants of insider volume provides evidence that illegal insider 
traders trade less volume on specialist systems such as the NYSE or AMEX in comparison to the 
dealer system of the NASDAQ.  Frino, Satchell and Wong (2008) suggest that illegal insiders face a 
trade off between the returns to be gained from illegal insider trading and the expected costs of 
utilising their non-public information.  They utilise a model that predicts the optimal volume to be 
traded by a risk-neutral investor with access to price sensitive inside information.  A relationship is 
developed where the optimal volume transacted by an insider is an increasing function of the 
sensitivity of the price to the information and a decreasing function of the penalty associated with 
getting caught.   In the model they include a variable that accounts for whether the market being 
traded in is a specialist or dealer market, among many other factors that affect the probability of 
sanction.  Through an analysis of a sample of 247 illegal insider trades executed during the period 
1996 to 2004, they find that insiders are more likely to trade greater volumes in a multiple dealer 
environment than with a specialist on the NYSE or AMEX. This is consistent with previous studies 
that highlight the non-anonymity implicit in the NYSE specialist system (Fishe and Robe, 2001; 
Garfinkel and Nimalendran, 2003). They conclude that insiders appear to constrain the volume they 
transact more when trading with specialists in comparison to other market structures. 
 
Garfinkel and Nimalendran (2003) examine the legal trades of corporate insiders on the NYSE and 
NASDAQ on a matched pair basis.  They find that effective spreads on the NYSE widen suggesting 
that insiders appear to be transparent on the NYSE.  On the contrary, effective spreads on the 
NASDAQ narrow on insider trading days, highlighting the fact that NASDAQ dealers do not adjust 
to the presence of insiders by raising effective spreads.  The authors choose to focus on effective 
spreads as they believe that market maker reaction is more accurately reflected in effective spreads 
as it can account for price improvement provided by market makers when trading.  They also 
examine the effect of insider trading on quoted spreads and find similar results. 
 
Similarly, Chung and Charorenwong (1998) study how the trading of corporate insiders and large 
shareholders affect the bid-ask spread.  Empirical results based on NYSE and AMEX open market 
transactions by directors, officers, and large shareholders who own more than 10% of the firm’s 
stocks during 1988 reveal that the spread on insider trading days is not significantly different from 
the spread on non-insider trading days.  In fact, they find that spreads are slightly smaller on insider 
trading days.  This is in direct contrast to the results of Fishe and Robe (2004) and Garfinkel and 
Nimalendran (2003), but in line with Chakravarty and McConnell (1999) and Cornell and Sirri 
(1992).  However, their results reveal that specialists establish larger spreads when there are 
unusually large transactions.  They also find that specialists maintain larger spreads generally for 
stocks with a greater extent of insider trading. These results are consistent with the prediction of the 
adverse selection model that specialists utilize spreads to recoup their losses to informed traders.  
 
Kini and Mian (1995) empirically examine whether the ownership structure of a firm’s share 
holdings influence the specialist’s choice of bid-ask spreads on the NYSE.  Equity ownership by 
insiders, institutions, and blockholders measured as a proportion of shares outstanding are used as 
separate proxies for potential adverse selection in order to test the predictions of asymmetric 
information models about the bid-ask spread.  Their proxies for adverse selection are dependent on 
the consensus that insiders have access to price sensitive information not possessed by the 
specialist, and that they potentially trade on this information.  Therefore if the specialist perceives 
that the proportion of equity ownership by insiders is a gauge of the potential level of adverse 
selection, then they expect to observe a positive relation between spreads and insider holdings.  
Their tests based on 1985 data for 1,063 firms representing a cross-section of NYSE firms finds no 
evidence of a positive relation between the bid-ask spread and insider ownership.  This result is in 
direct contrast to Chiang and Venkatesh’s (1988) and Sarin, Shastri, and Shastri’s (1999) findings 
that the proportion of equity held by insiders is positively related to bid-ask spreads on the specialist 
systems of the NYSE and AMEX, consistent with specialists’ perceiving insiders as informed 
traders.12  However, in contrast, Glosten and Harris (1988) document an insignificant relation 
between spreads and insider holdings for a sample of 250 NYSE stocks over the period 1981 to 
1983. 
 
                                                 
12  Their study is based on data from 1973 for a sample of 63 firms.  They also controlled for firm size. 
Kini and Mian (1995) also examine whether aggregate trading by corporate insiders as a proportion 
of total trading volume in the firm is related to bid-ask spreads.  This methodology is consistent 
with the work of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) who argue that the adverse selection problem for 
small firms is related to the number of insiders who trade shares relative to total trading volume.  
They do not find a significant relation between bid-ask spreads and insider trading13 (measured as 
total number of shares traded by insiders as a fraction of total trading volume for 1985).  These 
findings are contradictory to those of Garfinkel and Nimalendren (2003) regarding the impact of 
corporate insider trades on bid ask spreads on the NYSE.  They also add that their results are 
puzzling given that Seyhun (1992) reports that the level of profitability of insider trades has not 
diminished over time.  Overall, Kini and Mian conclude that their tests do not support the 
predictions of adverse selection models regarding the specialist system of the NYSE. 
 
Alternatively, a study by Cao, Field, and Hanka (2004) found no adverse change in the bid-ask 
spread and an improvement in the market depth after the expiration of IPO lockup provisions when 
pre-IPO shareholders, typically, managers or venture capitalists, are allowed to trade, possibly on 
inside information – even after controlling for increased float size.  They suggest that lockup 
expirations are an attractive venue for testing information asymmetry models, as they mark the 
“abrupt, pre-announced, large-scale entry of informed, blockholding insider traders into the equity 
markets for young, growth firms with high potential for information asymmetry”.  They examined 
1,497 NYSE and NASDAQ companies, mainly dominated by NASDAQ firms (1,274 firms), with 
only 223 (15 percent) being traded on the NYSE.  But in unreported tests they find no statistically 
significant long-term spread changes in either the NYSE or NASDAQ subsamples.  They interpret 
their results by claiming that expected losses due to insider trading are small relative to other costs 
of making a market, and hence have little effect on spreads and quoted depth. 
                                                 
13  They also find that their results regarding insider trading are not sensitive to the choice of proxy.  They investigated 
results using all trades by all insiders, open market trades by all insiders, all trades by officers, open market trades 
by officers, all trades by directors, and open market trades by directors.  They found that insider trading is not 
positively related to bid-ask spread. 
 It will be the aim of this study to try to resolve the conflicting findings of the prior studies by using 
a cross section of illegal insider trades, as many of the above mentioned studies were case studies 
and the results may not be generalised to all insider trades14 or their proxies for adverse selection or 
informed trading may be questionable.  Further, due to the unique nature of the simultaneous trades 
of the insiders in both the options on the CBOE and common stock on NYSE/NASDAQ, we will be 
able to analyse the three different market structures. 
 
 
3.3 Informed Trading and Differential Trader Anonymity 
 
The extent to which a certain trader’s identity is observable varies by market design.  On the floor 
of the NYSE all members of the trading crowd have the opportunity to observe who is trading and 
maybe infer the motivations behind the trade. In contrast, trader identity is less transparent on the 
decentralized and fragmented dealer system of the NASDAQ, where only the dealers negotiating 
with a trader may learn their identity and motivation for the trade. The remainder of the market 
including other dealers are not privy to this information even though the transacting dealer is 
required to report the price and number of shares exchanged after the transaction.  
 
Previous empirical literature comparing anonymity in the two market environments of the NYSE 
and NASDAQ is limited.  Garfinkel and Nimalendran (2003) infer the differential degrees of 
anonymity on the NASDAQ and NYSE by comparing proportional effective spread changes on 
days when corporate insiders trade with days when they do not. They find that the NYSE 
experiences larger spread increases than NASDAQ when insiders trade and conclude that the NYSE 
is less anonymous.  Alternatively, Gleason (2007) examines only the reported legal purchase of 
stocks by corporate insiders as she hypothesises that they are more likely to be informed trades, 
whereas the selling activity by corporate insiders is likely due to liquidity requirements.  She finds 
                                                 
14  With the exception of Meulbroek (1992), who uses a cross-section of SEC prosecuted insider trades from 1980 to 
1989.  However, she does not examine market liquidity, only price and volume run up. 
evidence that a stronger ‘spread-insider trading’ relationship exists under less competitive market 
making conditions, which provides evidence in the direction that a specialist system may be better 
equipped to identify informed trading.  The results are consistent with the Stoll (1978) hypothesis 
that inside quotes will be more responsive to informed trading risk under less competitive market 
making conditions.  
 
Heidle and Huang (1999) analyse firms that transfer to an alternative exchange structure and find 
that traders are more anonymous in a competing dealer market (NASDAQ) than in an auction 
environment (NYSE), consistent with Garfinkel and Nimalendran (1998).  They also show evidence 
that the changes in bid-ask spread due to the transfer are associated with changes in the probability 
of trading with an informed trader, indicating that a move to a multiple dealer environment may 
coincide with a lower ability to constrain informed trading. Grammig, Schiereck, and Theissen 
(2001) empirically analyse whether the degree of trader anonymity is related to the probability of 
information-based trading using data from the German stock market where a non-anonymous 
traditional floor based exchange co-exists with an anonymous computerized trading system.  They 
find that the probability of informed trading is significantly lower in the non-anonymous floor 
based trading system.  They also provide further evidence in line with Heidle and Huang (1999) that 
the size of the spread and the adverse selection component are positively related to the estimated 
probabilities of information based trading.  Theissen (2000) takes a different approach and analyses 
trading on the floor of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and shows that those transactions where the 
specialist grants price-improvement exhibit lower adverse-selection costs, but when there is a 
transaction without price improvement, the subsequent quote adjustment is significantly stronger.  
These results are consistent with the notion that the non-anonymity implicit in specialist structures 
allow for the identification of traders who are likely to possess private information and to price-
discriminate accordingly.   
 
Alternatively, Lee and Yi (2001) find that trader anonymity is reduced with greater trade size on the 
thinly traded options markets.  Hence, the relative extent of information based trading in the options 
(CBOE) and underlying stock markets decrease with trade size.  This is due to the fact that large 
trades in the options market may not be anonymous, and hence only smaller sized trades in the 
options market are informative compared to the stock market. 
 
Trader Anonymity is also closely related to market transparency as different disclosure rules and 
regulations on an exchange can also determine the level of trader anonymity afforded to an 
informed trader.  Waisburd (2003) examines how anonymity on an exchange affects liquidity by 
conducting a natural controlled experiment on 27 securities that transfer from a highly transparent 
regime, where the trader identity is revealed to all market participants, to a less transparent regime 
where only transaction participants observe the counterparty’s identity.  By examining one set of 
securities, trading in a single market structure on the Paris Bourse under two trade transparency 
regimes, they try to identify the marginal effect of identity disclosure given that the size and price of 
their transactions are readily observable. They find that the bid-ask spreads of the securities are on 
average narrowed when broker identities are disclosed to the whole market.  However, by further 
decomposing the effective spread, they find that adverse selection costs are statistically unchanged.  
They attribute the smaller spreads under the more transparent market to lower inventory costs.  This 
evidence is consistent with the notion that the ability to identify inventory management trades 
fosters risk sharing.  Hence the broker’s identity confers information regarding the nature of the 
order flow.  They also demonstrate that although order flow can be physically consolidated, such as 
on the NYSE, they may be informationally fragmented if important dimensions of the order flow 
such as trader identity are not shared among market participants.  They suggest that given greater 
liquidity is an objective of market regulators and exchange officials; it may be advantageous to 
design less anonymous markets. 
 
However, Kofman and Moser (1997) examine the bid ask spreads of a security traded under two 
segmented markets, one an automated anonymous market, and the other on open outcry market 
with greater transparency.  They find that although spreads in the two markets are not significantly 
different, the composition of the spread differs in that the reduced order processing costs of the 
automated system are offset by the increased information asymmetry costs from reduced 
transparency.  This finding is in contrast to Waisburd (2003), but supported by Pagano and Röell 
(1996) who conclude that greater trade transparency reduces adverse selection costs by enhancing 
the precision of market makers’ inferences regarding trade motivation. However, Rindi (2008) 
suggests that under certain conditions the public may be better served if the market is not trade 
transparent, and liquidity providers compete for trade data by offering more competitive spreads. 
Rindi (2008) develops a model based around a market in which risk-averse traders accommodate 
the liquidity demands of noise traders. But a fraction of these risk-averse investors are privately 
informed, which creates an adverse selection problem for the rest.  It follows that when the number 
of informed traders is given, transparency increases liquidity by reducing adverse selection costs. 
But disclosing traders’ identities diminishes the incentive to acquire information, so that increasing 
transparency can reduce the number of informed agents, hence liquidity. Through her theoretical 
analysis she finds that transparency can have different effects on liquidity depending on whether the 
entry of informed traders is fixed or endogenous.  She suggests that if ‘insider trading legislation is 
strong and well-enforced, costly, endogenously acquired information will be the most relevant, and 
the disclosure of traders’ identities will actually deprive informed liquidity suppliers of their 
monopoly on fundamental information, driving them out of the market and causing a drop in 
liquidity supply’.  But in the case of illegal insider trading, her findings support the view that higher 
trade transparency will reduce the adverse selection costs imposed by these illegal insiders on 
liquidity traders. 
 
Although previous studies into trader anonymity provide confounding and insightful results, they all 
use varying techniques and measures of informed trading and adverse selection costs.  Heidle and 
Huang (1999) use a natural experiment based on firms that switch exchanges, however their 
measure of informed trading is questionable as it is highly based on theoretical works and assume 
that order imbalances point to the occurrence of informed trading.  The composition of the 
aggregate order flow is qualitatively different, however, from knowledge about identities and 
trading motives of individual traders.  This is a very indirect and conspicuous measure of the degree 
of informed trading and has been shown to be analytically biased due to miss-classification by 
Boehmer, Grammig and Theissen (2007).  Also their sample of firms that switch listing locations 
may not be representative of the general population of stocks in each market.  This would also apply 
to the study conducted by Theissen (2000) and Grammig, Schiereck, and Theissen (2001).  
Garfinkel and Nimalendran (2003) and Gleason (2007) try to overcome this issue by using 
corporate insider trading data, however it is highly unlikely that filings of legal corporate insider 
trades would actually be based on material information as this would constitute a crime.  Hence by 
using SEC prosecuted insider trades we are able to remove all doubt pertaining to the informed 
nature of the trades in our database, and directly observe the reaction of market makers in the three 
markets (CBOE, NYSE & NASDAQ).  This will provide the most robust and directly measurable 
results regarding informed trading, market maker reaction and trader anonymity to date. 
 CHAPTER 4 
 
4. Hypothesis Development 
 
Literature suggests that the traditional specialist and dealer systems differ implicitly in the manner 
in which they handle informed trading and market liquidity.  Further, previous literature finds that 
the two structures offer differential levels of trader anonymity, which may have an impact on the 
ability of market makers to identify informed trading.  Therefore in this study we compare the 
cross-sectional impact of illegal insider trading (informed trading) on liquidity in the two competing 
market structures. 
 
In addition, literature on the hybrid structure of the CBOE, where a specialist system is 
superimposed on an existing dealer system, is limited.  Thus, since options are derivatives, one 
would expect that they be affected in the same manner as the underlying stock when an informed 
trader trades in both securities on the same day, based on the same information.  Hence, we expect 
changes in liquidity measured by bid-ask spreads should be similar for both the options market and 
the underlying share market.  However, the market making structure of the underlying 
(NYSE/NASDAQ) differs to the market making structure of the options (CBOE).  Thus, we would 
expect that these differences in market making structure between the underlying and derivative 
options market would lead to differential liquidity effects due to illegal insider trading.  
 
In line with Glosten (1989) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) we expect to find that the NYSE 
specialist system would display greater increases in spreads during insider trading compared to the 
CBOE and NASDAQ.  This is due to the fact that the all trades are executed by the specialist on the 
NYSE who has total knowledge of order flow and enjoys a monopolistic market power that allows 
them to revise quotes accordingly after each trade.  Whereas, the existence of competitive dealers 
on both the CBOE and NASDAQ means that an informed trader can simultaneously trade with 
different dealers before quotes are adjusted.  This is because dealers are unable to segregate the 
informed traders from the liquidity traders (Heidle and Huang, 2002). In addition the theoretical 
work by Benveniste et al. (1992) suggests that the reputation effect of the repeated dealings between 
the specialist and the floor brokers reflect specific types of order flow. Chakravarty (2001) reports 
that, in practice, the NYSE specialist infers the motivation for SuperDOT orders based on repeated 
observation of broker mnemonics displayed on the specialist’s computer terminal.  Auction markets 
are also inherently more transparent than dealer markets, as more information is made available to 
all market participants.  This leads to our first two hypotheses: 
 
H1: Spreads will increase for NYSE listed stocks on insider trading days. 
 
H2: Spreads will remain unchanged for NASDAQ listed stocks on insider trading days. 
 
The CBOE has a DPM which acts much like a specialist with total knowledge of the limit order 
book, which could aid in the identification of informed traders.  This is in line with the ‘truth 
telling’ argument of Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992) from the trading floor interactions of 
the specialist.  But unlike the NYSE specialist, the DPM on the CBOE does not enjoy a 
monopolistic market power.  In addition since they only have knowledge of the limit order book but 
not the trades of the dealers, it is possible that informed traders can strategically trade with different 
dealers and avoid the specialist so quotes are adjusted at a slower rate.  Hasbrouck and Sofianos 
(1993) find that the trades in which the specialist participates have a higher immediate impact on 
the quotes than trades with no specialist participation. Furthermore, institutional arrangements on 
the CBOE prevent dealers from handling limit orders which further limits their knowledge of order 
flow. Therefore although the CBOE has a specialist, market structure would suggest that the market 
is in fact fragmented much like the NASDAQ, and this would hinder the identification of informed 
traders.  This leads to our third hypothesis: 
 H2: Spreads will remain unchanged for CBOE listed option contracts on insider trading days. 
 CHAPTER 5 
 
5. Data and Method 
 
5.1 Data & Sample Selection 
 
This study tests the hypotheses developed in the previous section.  In order to do so we require a 
sample of illegal insider trades for which there is simultaneous trading in the stock and option 
contracts of a particular company, as well as microstructure data such as bid and ask prices, 
transactions prices and volumes.  
 
The illegal insider trading data are drawn from litigation reports made available on the SEC website 
(http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases.shtml) when the SEC formally brings an action against an 
individual.  We collect data on illegal insider trading cases pursued by the SEC from January 1998 
to December 2007.  Specifically, those SEC litigation releases that contain the key words “insider” 
and  “10(b),” which refer to Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5.  
We then manually construct a database of all these illegal insider trading cases. The database has 
the following information for each illegal insider trade: Litigation Release Number, Court, Name of 
Trader, Corporation, Exchange, Broker, Instrument traded, Buy/Sell, Date of Trade, Time of Trade, 
Value of Trade, Profit, Date of Announcement, Strike Price and Expiry (for options), and numerous 
other fields which are not relevant to this study.  Additional information about the cases is collected 
from other legal databases such as Lexis-Nexis, or finance databases such as Bloomberg, Yahoo 
Finance, and SEC annual reports. The database has trades that span across both stock and options, 
and a number of warrants and other securities.  There are 229 unique cases in total, and 3830 
individual illegal insider trades logged.   
 
We manually identify those unique dates in which there is illegal insider trading on both the options 
and underlying stock of a company based around the same impending price sensitive 
announcement.   For each insider trading day in a particular contract or stock, we aggregate all 
trades by insiders on that day.  Specifically, if the same prosecuted insider trader trades more than 
once, or if more than one insider trades in the same stock or contract on the same day, we treat all 
trades on that day as a single observation.  This avoids double counting of microstructure data. We 
are able to identify 126 unique illegal insider trading days on which the insiders simultaneously 
traded in both the options and stock of a company.   
 
The litigation reports are not standardized and therefore, many observations are lost due to 
incomplete case data. Table 1 describes the proportion of observations that are included in our 
sample compared to the population of unique same day paired stock-option trades over the sample 
period. The sample consists of 44 unique same day paired stock-option trades out of a possible 126, 
representing 34.92% of the population. As a point of comparison, Meulbroek (1992) who similarly 
uses publicly available litigation reports and confidential case files to build her sample, is only able 
to analyse data that captures 69% of defendants charged with insider trading between the years 
1980 to 1989.15 While our study is further constrained due to the analysis of options where specific 
contract information is rarely available, it nevertheless highlights the fact that significant data loss 
occurs when attempting to extract information from non-standardised litigation reports. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Our sample selection criteria are similar to Meulbroek’s (1992) except that her analysis does not require data on the 
penalty levelled against the insider. 
  
Table 1 – Same Day Paired Stock and Option Trades: January 1998 to December 2007 
This table reports the total population of same day paired stock and option trades in all litigation reports filed between 
January 1998 and December 2007. The population of same day paired stock and option trades consists of all those 
unique days on which the insiders traded both the stock and options of a particular firm.  The year corresponds to the 
year in which the insider trade occurred and not the year of prosecution. This table also reports the number of same day 
paired stock and option trades remaining in the sample once all filters have been applied.  
 
Year Full Same Day Population Full Same Day Sample Percent in Sample
1998 12 4 33.33%
1999 14 3 21.43%
2000 12 5 41.67%
2001 8 1 12.50%
2002 3 0 0.00%
2003 7 2 28.57%
2004 9 9 100.00%
2005 43 16 37.21%
2006 2 1 50.00%
2007 3 3 100.00%
Total 113 44 38.94%  
 
Table 2 depicts the sample selection criteria. There are 126 observations available over the sample 
period. Thirty three observations are lost because the illegal insider trades were executed on the day 
of the price sensitive announcement on which they were trading.  This filter is applied as we would 
be unable to untangle the effect of the insider trading from the effect of the announcement using our 
proposed methodology.  A further 13 observations are removed from the sample as these trades 
were executed after the price sensitive information announcement and are likely to be liquidating 
trades which are not information motivated.  Twenty five observations are lost because they do not 
include both the expiry month and strike price for the paired options which were traded.  This is 
because we are unable to determine exactly which option contract the illegal insiders traded without 
the knowledge of both the expiry and strike price.  Finally, a further 11 observations are lost 
because no microstructure data is available for either the stock or options contract for that day.  The 
final sample is 44 unique same day paired stock-option illegal insider trading days with trading on 
20 different companies and information sourced from 19 different SEC cases.  In addition, there are 
29 stock trades on NASDAQ, and 15 on the NYSE.  There are also 32 options trades on the CBOE, 
and 4 on each PCX, AMEX, and PHLX. 
 
Table 2 – Sample Selection Criteria 
Filter Observations Lost Observations Available
All unique same day option‐stock insider trading days 126
Trades on the day of information announcements 33 93
Trades after announcements 13 80
No option contract data (ie. Both Expiry Month and Strike Price) 25 55
No mircostructure data 11 44
Total unique same day option‐stock insider trading days 44
Percentage of Total 34.92%  
 
Microstructure data relating to transaction and quote data for the illegal option and stock insider 
trading days and control period is collected manually from the Securities Industry Research Centre 
of Asia-Pacific’s16(SIRCA) TAQTIC17 Database.   TAQTIC is a historical market data service, 
offering global intra-day time and sales, time and quotes and market depth content for an extensive 
range of equities, including their derivatives. The transaction and quote data include time, volume, 
trade price, and bid and ask prices.  Market depth measures are not available for all option contracts 
and stocks, and hence constrain our analysis of liquidity to just bid ask spreads, although we 
recognize that market depth is an important component of liquidity.  We use the Lee and Ready 
(1991) algorithm to determine trade direction for the non-insider trades. For all CBOE trades we 
only analyse data from 2000 to 2007, as the implementation of a DPM for all equity options on the 
CBOE was not fully implemented until the end of 1999, before which it was a competitive market 
making system.  However, our dataset includes some option trades prior to 1999 which were 
executed on the AMEX, PHLX, or PCX which were organised under the hybrid market making 
                                                 
16 http://www.sirca.org.au/ 
17 https://taqtic.sirca.org.au/ 
 
structure during the time of the trades.  Table 3 and 4 highlight the distribution of data in the 
sample. 
 
 
Table 3 – Distribution of Trades across Markets 
This table reports the distribution of all trades across different markets.  Stock and option trades are reported separately.  
It must be noted that there is an equal number of trades in both stocks and options as they are paired trades by the same 
insiders.  
NASDAQ NYSE CBOE PCX AMEX PHLX
44 29 15 32 4 4 4
Total Unique Insider 
Trading Days
Stock Insider Trading Days Option Insider Trading Days
 
 
 
Table 4 –Distribution of sample across years 
This table reports the distribution of the sample across years, by the number of companies in which trades occurred, the 
number of SEC cases, and the number of unique option contracts that were traded (further broken down into calls and 
puts). 
Year n Companies Cases Unique Option Contracts Calls Puts
1998 4 4 4 4 4 0
1999 3 2 2 3 3 0
2000 5 3 3 5 5 0
2001 1 1 1 1 1 0
2002 0 0 0 0 0 0
2003 2 1 2 2 2 0
2004 9 3 3 7 1 6
2005 16 4 2 5 4 1
2006 1 1 1 1 1 0
2007 3 1 1 3 3 0
Total 44 20 19 31 24 7  
 
 
 
5.2 Method 
 
In examining the reaction of market makers on the NYSE and NASDAQ when illegal insiders 
trade, this analysis will firstly confirm if the specialist market making system is more effective than 
the competitive dealer market making system in detecting informed trading.  In addition by 
examining simultaneous illegal insider trades in the paired options of the underlying stocks this 
study will also explore whether hybrid market making systems react differently to the traditional 
specialist and dealer structures in instances of illegal insider trading.  
 
In this study we use the bid ask spread as a measure of market liquidity.  Specifically, this study 
will examine changes in the average response of market makers to illegal insider trading as the 
difference between the average proportional effective spread (PES) and average proportional quoted 
spread (PQS) on illegal insider trading days and a corresponding average daily effective and quoted 
spread measure during the control period.  This method was proposed by Garfinkel and 
Nimalendran (2003) in their study of differential trader anonymity.  The same method is employed 
in this study due to several attractive properties.  Similar to Garfinkel and Nimalendran, we only 
know the day of the insider trade for most of the illegal insider trades and hence use the average 
change in spreads for the insider trading day.  Secondly, due to the fact that market makers on many 
occasions are not entirely sure of the informational content of an informed trade, they may choose 
to impound the information into their quote after the trade has occurred.  This is because the market 
makers continue to face some adverse selection risk and choose to protect themselves throughout 
the day.  In addition, spreads tend to vary across stocks with the higher-priced stocks having higher 
absolute spreads. Hence we use proportional quoted and effective spreads as we are interested in the 
cross-sectional variation of the spread, and the use of absolute spreads would tend to bias our 
results.  
 
In line with Garfinkel and Nimalendran’s reasoning we use effective spreads, in addition to quoted 
spreads in order to model the potential reactions of market makers to insider trades.  They suggest 
that since the market maker has the option to provide price improvement and execute trades inside 
the quote, when they are certain that the trade is uninformed, the quoted spread is an insufficient 
measure of market maker reaction.  However, the effective spread measure is able to detect such 
price improvements and hence able to accurately capture the behavior of market makers.  This is 
because the effective spread is non-zero anytime the transaction price differs from the quote 
midpoint.  Therefore a market maker’s reaction to a potentially informed trade, and perhaps an 
unwillingness to provide liquidity to incoming market orders, could cause fewer orders to be 
executed inside the quotes, leading to an increase in the effective spread.  In contrast, the quoted 
spread is only valid for the quoted depth or size and, therefore only captures the cost of transacting 
at relatively small volumes. 
 
For each quote the PQS is calculated as the difference between the standing quoted ask and bid 
price, as a proportion of the standing bid-ask quote midpoint.  This is then averaged across all the 
quotes on any particular day.  Therefore the PQS on day t is: 
 
 
Where: 
nt is the number of quotes for day t. 
and are the ask and bid quotes respectively on trading day t.   
 
 
For each trade the PES is calculated as twice the difference between the midpoint of the standing 
bid ask quote and the trade price, as a proportion of the standing bid ask quote midpoint.  This is 
then averaged across all the transactions on any particular day.  Therefore the PES on day t is: 
 
 
 
 
Where: 
nt is the number of transactions for day t. 
and are the ask and bid quotes respectively, and are at least five seconds before any 
transaction i at a price of  on trading day t.   
 
Bid ask spreads tend to vary with the price of a stock and are often subject to arbitrary minimum 
tick size rules. Consequently, following McInish and Wood’s (1992) study, we also examine a time 
weighted bid ask spread measure. That is, each spread is weighted by the amount of time it existed 
and divided by the time weighted midpoint price.  
 
The time weighted proportional quoted spread on day t, TW_PQSt is calculated as: 
 
 
 
Where; 
Di is the duration of quotation i in seconds, L is the number of seconds for the trading day. 
and are the ask and bid quotes, respectively, on trading day t.  
k is the number of quotations for the day. 
 
Similarly the time weighted proportional effective spread on day t, TW_PESt is calculated as: 
 
 
 
Where; 
Di is the duration that the effective spread was standing, or the time between each trade i in seconds, 
L is the number of seconds for the trading day. 
nt is the number of transactions for day t. 
and are the ask and bid quotes respectively, and are at least five seconds before any 
transaction i at a price of  on trading day t.   
 
 
5.2.1 Control Period 
 
 
In order to gauge the change in proportional spreads on illegal insider trading days, we must have a 
benchmark to which to compare it to.  The control period in this study will be the period [t - 1], 
where t = 0 is the day of the illegal insider trades in the stock and options.  This is in contrast to 
Garfinkel and Nimalendran who use a control period of [t + 11, t + 15] because their sample 
indicated that corporate insiders typically traded after information events.  However, in our dataset 
the main characteristic of illegal insider trades is that they take place before an information event.  
Therefore the analysis in this study does not require an eleven day buffer.  Instead we take the day 
before the illegal insider trades as the control period as this in line with the study of illegal insider 
trading by Fishe and Robe (2004). 
 
 
5.2.2 Analysis 
 
To assess the differential change in liquidity on the different markets, we compare changes in PQS 
(and TW_PQS) and PES (and TW_PES) between insider and non-insider trading days for the 
NYSE, NASDAQ, and CBOE firms. Specifically, for each unique insider trading day on each 
market we first calculate the difference between the PQS (TW_PQS) and PES (TW_PES) on the 
insider trading day and the average PQS (TW_PQS) and PES (TW_PES) during the control period. 
We denote this change in PQS (TW_PQS) and PES (TW_PES) as DPQS (DTW_PQS) and DPES 
(DTW_PES), respectively.  
 
 
5.2.3 Controlling for Other Factors that May Affect Changes in Spread Measures 
 
It is possible that factors such as risk, stock/contract price, and trading activity can change between 
the control period and insider trading day, and such changes are likely to affect market maker 
behaviour.   Therefore, in order to yield robust results we investigate whether these factors account 
for the changes in bid ask spreads on insider trading days.  Schwartz (1988) and McInish and Wood 
(1992) document that trading activity, volatility, and stock/contract price are determinants of bid 
ask spreads.   Following Chung and Charoenwong (1998), we fit cross-sectional regressions for the 
four spread measures in our analysis.  These regression models allow for the effects of the date of 
trade being an insider trading day to be isolated from other explanatory factors. The model 
specifications we fit for the cross-sectional regressions are outlined below: 
 
BASi = α0 + α1 Ln(Volume) + α2 Risk + α3 sqrt(Price) + α4 Insider  + ε  (1) 
 
BASi = α0 + α1 sqrt(Trades) + α2 Risk + α3 sqrt(Price) + α4 Insider  + ε  (2) 
 
Each equation is estimated for the average daily quoted bid ask spread, time weighted quoted bid 
ask spread, average daily effective spread, and time weighted effective spread as the dependant 
variable.  The regressors are outlined below: 
 
Ln(Volume) – is the natural logarithm of the total amount of shares traded for that stock or option 
contract for that day. Schwartz (1988) suggests that greater trading activity can lead to lower 
spreads due to economies of scale in trading costs.  Tinic (1972) shows that the average number of 
shares traded is a significant determinant of bid ask spreads.  Since the distribution of Volume is 
high skewed, we use the log of Volume in line with Chung and Charoenwong (1998). 
 
sqrt(Trades)- is the square root of the number of trades for that day.  Benston and Hagerman (1974) 
find that the number of transactions is a significant determinant of bid ask spreads and also a direct 
measure of trading activity. The square root of Trades is taken to reduce the influence of outliers, 
consistent with McInish and Wood (1992). 
 
Risk – is measured as the standard deviation of percentage changes in bid ask spread midpoints, 
consistent with the measure used in Brook, Patel and Su (2003). It is calculated as follows: 
 
N
2
t
t=1
(r - r)
Volatility = 
N
∑
 
t t-1
t
t-1
t
P - Pwhere : r = ×100%
P
            r = the mean of  r
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
 
Previous research suggests that a dealer's risk of holding a security is a significant determinant of 
the bid ask spread.  Volatility of returns is a direct measure of risk and an indirect measure of the 
level of information (French and Roll, 1986). In addition, higher volatility is typically associated 
with higher transaction costs (Petersen and Fialkowski, 1994).  The use of quote midpoints rather 
than transaction prices helps to avoid spurious volatility due to bid ask bounce which usually 
imparts an upward bias in price volatility estimates (see Venkatesh, 1992).  Additionally, noise in 
returns caused by infrequent trades is further reduced. 
 
sqrt(Price) -  is the square root of the average price measured using the midpoint of the spread. The 
square root of Price is taken to reduce the influence of outliers, consistent with McInish and Wood 
(1992). 
 
Insider- is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if it is an insider trading day, otherwise 
zero. 
 
We fit separate regressions for Ln(Volume) and sqrt(Trades) as they are likely to be linearly related 
and result in multicollinearity within the same regression.  The regressions are estimated using the 
daily average values for the variables during the control period and insider trading day. The 
regressions are estimated separately for the NYSE and NASDAQ listed or underlying stocks and 
option contracts. A correlation matrix is examined for variables in the above regression models. 
Each model is tested for heteroscedasticity, where present, heteroscedasticity corrected standard 
errors, consistent with the White (1980) correction method, are used. 
 CHAPTER 6 
 
6. Results 
 
6.1 Basic Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics of the daily averages for the four spread measures (PQS, 
TW_PQS, PES, and TW_PES), the average quoted midpoint (Price), total volume of trading 
(Volume), number of trades per day (Trades), and the standard deviation of percentage changes in 
bid ask spread midpoints (Risk) on insider trading days.  We report the numbers separately for 
equities and options in tables 5 and 6, respectively, and also separately for NYSE listed and 
NASDAQ listed stocks.  Care should be taken when interpreting these values in the context of 
previous research on spreads, since most measures are calculated on insider trading days.  
Moreover, comparisons across trading regimes may be misleading at this stage since we have not 
scaled by the appropriate non-insider trading day values yet.  Nevertheless, it is worth noting a few 
interesting patterns in the data and differences across exchanges. 
 
6.1.1 Equities Descriptive Statistics 
 
For equities, NASDAQ stocks appear to exhibit higher average and median proportional quoted and 
effective spreads ( on insider trading days) than the NYSE listed stocks in our sample.  This finding 
conforms to more general empirical evidence, especially for the early part of the 1990s that suggest 
that NASDAQ spreads are higher on average. 
 Table 5 – Equities Descriptive Statistics 
This table provides mean, median, maximum and minimum values for our sample of stock trades on insider trading 
days, across several variables.  PQS represents the Proportional Quoted Spread on insider trading days.  TW_PQS 
represents the Time-Weighted Proportional Quoted Spread on insider trading days.  PES represents the Proportional 
Effective Spread on insider trading days.  TW_PES represents the Time-Weighted Proportional Effective Spread on 
insider trading days.  Price is the average quoted midpoint on insider trading days.  Volume is the total volume of shares 
transacted on insider trading days.  Trades is the total number of transactions on insider trading days.  Risk is the 
standard deviation of percentage changes in quoted bid ask spread midpoints on insider trading days. 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum
NASDAQ
n=29
PQS (Proportional Quoted Spread) 0.0025 0.0018 0.0009 0.0074
TW_PQS (Time‐Weighted Proportional Quoted Spread) 0.0089 0.0078 0.0031 0.0343
PES (Proportional Effective Spread) 0.0024 0.0013 0.0006 0.0103
T_PES (Time‐Weighted Proportional Effective Spread) 0.0059 0.0045 0.0004 0.0395
Price (Quote Midpoint) 32.09 38.61 12.00 47.98
Volume (number of shares traded) 684,180.86 243,300.00 47,669.00 3,758,515.00
Trades (number of trades per day) 1,861.17 701.00 108.00 9,567.00
Risk (standard deviation of intraday percentage returns) 0.1425 0.0925 0.0264 0.9334
NYSE
n=15
PQS (Proportional Quoted Spread) 0.0019 0.0014 0.0001 0.0062
TW_PQS (Time‐Weighted Proportional Quoted Spread) 0.0018 0.0011 0.0002 0.0055
PES (Proportional Effective Spread) 0.0018 0.0013 0.0002 0.0070
T_PES (Time‐Weighted Proportional Effective Spread) 0.0018 0.0013 0.0002 0.0063
Price (Quote Midpoint) 46.89 34.94 19.58 89.33
Volume (number of shares traded) 1,333,973.33 861,700.00 75,200.00 3,229,400.00
Trades (number of trades per day) 1,227.47 909.00 35.00 3,071.00
Risk (standard deviation of intraday percentage returns) 0.0626 0.0477 0.0093 0.1894
EQUITIES
 
 
One potential explanation for the higher spreads on NASDAQ could possibly be the superior 
position of the NYSE specialist who is able to observe all order flow and extract information 
through their physical dealings with floor brokers as suggested by Benveniste, Marcus and Wilhelm 
(1992), allowing for more favourable prices.  Quoted midpoints are also lower for the NASDAQ 
listed stocks in our sample, which is characteristic of the less mature firms that are listed on 
NASDAQ as compared to the NYSE.  Interestingly, the average number of shares traded (Volume) 
is twice as great for the NYSE listed stocks, whereas the average number of trades is slightly lower 
than that of the NASDAQ stocks.  This suggests that fundamentally, the NASDAQ listed stocks in 
our sample are less liquid with a lower average trade size, in contrast to the highly liquid NYSE 
stocks.  In addition we find that the NASDAQ stocks in our sample are on average more than twice 
as risky (as measured by the average standard deviation of percentage changes in quoted midpoints) 
as the NYSE stocks, which may be yet another explanation for the higher average spreads for the 
NASDAQ stocks. 
 
 
6.1.2 Options Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 6 outlines the descriptive statistics for the counterpart stock options contracts that were 
simultaneously traded.  It appears that there are no significant differences in the spreads of the 
option contracts for NYSE and NASDAQ underlying stocks.  This result is not surprising 
considering that although the underlying stocks are traded in different market structures, the option 
contracts are all in fact traded on the same hybrid structures of the CBOE, PCX, AMEX, and 
PHLX.  However, there are some fundamental differences among the NYSE and NASDAQ 
underlying stock option contracts.  The NASDAQ underlying stock option contracts are on average 
priced half as much as the NYSE underlying stock option contracts.  This may be due to contracts 
of different time to maturities or volatility being traded.  Further it seems the NASDAQ underlying 
stock option contracts are significantly more liquid than the NYSE underlying stock options with 
almost ten times the average Volume (number of shares traded) and five times the average number 
of trades per day (Trades).  Again, this may be as a consequence of the differing time to maturities 
or option ‘money-ness’ of the contracts being traded, as at the money options or close to maturity 
options experience higher liquidity.   
  
Table 6 – Options Descriptive Statistics 
This table provides mean, median, maximum and minimum values for our sample of options trades across several 
variables.  PQS represents the Proportional Quoted Spread on insider trading days.  TW_PQS represents the Time-
Weighted Proportional Quoted Spread on insider trading days.  PES represents the Proportional Effective Spread on 
insider trading days.  TW_PES represents the Time-Weighted Proportional Effective Spread on insider trading days.  
Price is the average quoted midpoint on insider trading days.  Volume is the total volume of shares transacted on insider 
trading days.  Trades is the total number of transactions on insider trading days.  Risk is the standard deviation of 
percentage changes in quoted bid ask spread midpoints on insider trading days. 
 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum
NASDAQ UNDERLYING
n=29
PQS (Proportional Quoted Spread) 0.1200 0.0737 0.0276 0.4409
TW_PQS (Time‐Weighted Proportional Quoted Spread) 0.1175 0.0729 0.0269 0.4672
PES (Proportional Effective Spread) 0.1283 0.0793 0.0267 0.6892
T_PES (Time‐Weighted Proportional Effective Spread) 0.1107 0.0637 0.0012 0.5806
Price (Quote Midpoint) 1.68 1.35 0.28 3.96
Volume (number of shares traded) 1,294.59 201.00 3.00 9,217.00
Trades (number of trades per day) 52.55 13.00 1.00 346.00
Risk (standard deviation of intraday percentage returns) 3.1714 2.0466 0.3451 14.3225
NYSE UNDERLYING
n=15
PQS (Proportional Quoted Spread) 0.1236 0.0711 0.0285 0.5274
TW_PQS (Time‐Weighted Proportional Quoted Spread) 0.1156 0.0667 0.0303 0.4658
PES (Proportional Effective Spread) 0.1441 0.0723 0.0244 0.8111
T_PES (Time‐Weighted Proportional Effective Spread) 0.0980 0.0641 0.0111 0.4537
Price (Quote Midpoint) 3.14 1.99 0.25 9.92
Volume (number of shares traded) 175.07 125.00 8.00 516.00
Trades (number of trades per day) 10.33 7.00 1.00 36.00
Risk (standard deviation of intraday percentage returns) 5.1849 2.9460 0.2500 24.0706
OPTIONS
 
 
Surprisingly, the NYSE underlying stock option contracts are slightly more risky than the 
NASDAQ underlying stock options, even though their counterpart underlying stocks exhibits 
almost double the risk of the NASDAQ listed stocks. 
 
 
 
6.2 Basic Results 
 
6.2.1 Equities Basic Results 
 
Table 7 reports the changes in bid ask spreads between the control period and insider trading day 
for the NYSE and NASDAQ stocks.  In general, it appears the NYSE specialists react differently to 
insider trading than the NASDAQ dealers.  Focusing on proportional quoted (and time weighted) 
spreads; we find that there is an increase in both the mean proportional quoted spread and the time 
weighted counterpart of 0.02% (significant at the 20% level) and 0.03% (significant at the 10% 
level), respectively, for the NYSE listed stocks, consistent with H1.  In contrast, there is a decrease 
in mean proportional quoted spreads of 0.03% for the NASDAQ listed stocks significant at the 15% 
level, and a 0.1% decrease for the time weighted counterpart which approaches marginal 
significance given the small sample size.  The finding that quoted spreads narrow on NASDAQ on 
insider trading days is contradictory to H2, as we would expect no reaction and certainly not an 
improvement in liquidity.  In addition we find that there is a significant increase in both the mean 
proportional effective spread (0.03% increase, significant at the 20% level) and its time weighted 
counterpart (0.04% increase, significant at the 15% level) on the NYSE, also consistent with H1.  
Whereas, for the NASDAQ listed stocks there is no significant change observed, which is 
consistent with H2. 
 
These results suggest that NYSE specialists react to insider trading by reducing liquidity on insider 
trading days in the form of higher quoted spreads and also provide less price improvement in the 
form of widening effective spreads.  In contrast, liquidity surprisingly improves on NASDAQ in the 
form of reduced quoted spreads.  This may be as a consequence of an influx of what Cornell and 
Sirri (1992) term as ‘falsely informed traders’ into the market.  Falsely informed traders are defined 
as “agents who fail to recognize the extent of the inside information reflected in the market price, 
and hence incorrectly believe they have superior information”.  Fishe and Robe (2004) also find an 
increase in non-insider volume on insider trading days and attribute this to ‘falsely informed 
traders’.  Considering our sample consists of illegal insider trades around predominantly mergers 
and earnings announcements which may be anticipated by other traders, it is likely that these traders 
fail to realise that insiders have already traded on the information and hence become ‘falsely 
informed traders’.  In addition, NASDAQ dealers fail to react to insider trading as they exhibit no 
significant change in effective spreads and continue to provide the same amount of price 
improvement as a non-insider trading day.  These results are consistent with the fragmented nature 
of the NASDAQ dealer system and the implicit trader anonymity afforded to informed traders in 
comparison to the NYSE specialist system. 
 
Our results are similar to Fishe and Robe (2004), and Garfinkel and Nimalendran (2003) in that we 
find liquidity is reduced on the NYSE on insider trading days, while in contrast liquidity improves 
or remains unchanged on NASDAQ.  Additionally, the results lend further support to the theoretical 
findings of Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and Leach and 
Madhavan (1993), which suggest that the unique structure of the NYSE specialist who is able to 
observe all order flow and physically interact with floor brokers allows the NYSE to better deal 
with informed trading and reduce trader anonymity.  This also suggests that the findings of Cornell 
and Sirri (1992) and Chakravarty and McConnell (1997) on spreads could not generalize beyond 
their case studies when examined in a cross-sectional framework such as this study. 
 
  
 
Table 7 – Estimates of Changes in Bid Ask Spread Measures for NYSE and NASDAQ listed stocks 
This table presents univariate estimates of the changes in bid ask spread measures due to insider trading.  DPQS equals PQS on insider trading day minus its average control period 
counterpart.  DTW_PQS equals TW_PQS on insider trading day minus its average control period counterpart.  DPES equals PES on insider trading day minus its average control 
period counterpart.  DTW_PES equals TW_PES on insider trading day minus its average control period counterpart.  PQS represents the Proportional Quoted Spread.  TW_PQS 
represents the Time-Weighted Proportional Quoted Spread.  PES represents the Proportional Effective Spread.  TW_PES represents the Time-Weighted Proportional Effective 
Spread. 
n=15 n=29
Mean P ‐Value Median P‐Value Mean P ‐Value Median P‐Value
DPQS (Proportional Quoted Spread) 0.0002 (0.1589)* ‐0.00006 (0.6072) ‐0.0003 (0.1141)** ‐0.00002 (0.7111)
DTW_PQS (TW_Proportional Quoted Spread) 0.0003 (0.0574)*** 0.000281 (0.1185)** ‐0.001 (0.2100) 0.00007 (0.4583)
DPES (Proportional Effective Spread) 0.0003 (0.1696)* ‐0.00002 (1.0000) ‐0.0001 (0.6987) 0.00008 (0.0241)****
DTW_PES (TW_Proportional Effective Spread) 0.0004 (0.1118)** 0.00007 (0.3018) 0.001 (0.5283) 0.00107 (0.4583)
EQUITIES
* - denotes significance at the 20% level
**- denotes significance at the 15% level
***- denotes significance at the 10% level
****- denotes significance at the 5% level
*****- denotes significance at the 1% level
NYSE NASDAQ
Spread Measure
 
 
6.2.2 Options Basic Results 
 
We also examine market maker reaction to insider trading in the option contracts of the counterpart 
stocks which were traded on the very same day, based on the same information.  Ideally we would 
expect that the market maker reaction to the informed trading in the counterpart option contracts for 
the same underlying stocks would exhibit a similar change in liquidity, if the market makers are 
able to identify the information on which the insiders are trading.  However, the market structure of 
the options markets (CBOE, PCX, AMEX, and PHLX) is fundamentally different to both the 
underlying NYSE specialist and NASDAQ dealer systems, and this could lead to a different 
reaction to the insider trading.  Additionally, the hybrid options markets may offer differential 
trader anonymity in comparison to the traditional specialist and dealer systems, which may affect 
the degree to which informed traders are identified. 
 
We report the changes in spreads between the control period and insider trading day for NYSE and 
NASDAQ underlying stock options separately, as they are two different samples and would 
additionally allow us to examine the differential impact of insider trading on spreads for the same 
underlying securities in two different market structures.  Surprisingly, we find that the market 
maker reaction to insider trading on stock options is dependent on whether the underlying stock is 
NYSE or NASDAQ listed. 
 
 
  
Table 8 – Estimates of Changes in Bid Ask Spread Measures for NYSE and NASDAQ underlying stock options  
This table presents univariate estimates of the changes in bid ask spread measures due to insider trading.  DPQS equals PQS on insider trading day minus its average control period 
counterpart.  DTW_PQS equals TW_PQS on insider trading day minus its average control period counterpart.  DPES equals PES on insider trading day minus its average control 
period counterpart.  DTW_PES equals TW_PES on insider trading day minus its average control period counterpart.  PQS represents the Proportional Quoted Spread.  TW_PQS 
represents the Time-Weighted Proportional Quoted Spread.  PES represents the Proportional Effective Spread.  TW_PES represents the Time-Weighted Proportional Effective 
Spread. 
n=15,  n=29, 
Mean P ‐Value Median P‐Value Mean P ‐Value Median P‐Value
DPQS (Proportional Quoted Spread) ‐0.018 (0.4653) ‐0.00424 (0.3018) ‐0.026 (0.0786)*** ‐0.00106 (0.7111)
DTW_PQS (TW_Proportional Quoted Spread) ‐0.029 (0.2137) ‐0.0056 (0.1185)** ‐0.028 (0.0560)*** ‐0.00449 (0.0614)***
DPES (Proportional Effective Spread) ‐0.019 (0.2373) ‐0.01479 (0.7539) ‐0.015 (0.7071) 0.00061 (1.0000)
DTW_PES (TW_Proportional Effective Spread) 0.0291 (0.0371)**** 0.019989 (0.1094)** 0.0035 (0.9044) 0.00199 (1.0000)
OPTIONS
Spread Measure
NYSE UNDERLYING NASDAQ UNDERLYING
Note: due to no transactions on some control days in options, effective spread 
measures have n = 10.
Note: due to no transactions on some control days in options, effective spread measures 
have n = 21.
* - denotes significance at the 20% level
**- denotes significance at the 15% level
***- denotes significance at the 10% level
****- denotes significance at the 5% level
*****- denotes significance at the 1% level  
 
The differential effects of illegal insider trading on quoted bid ask spreads for different underlying 
stock markets is an unexpected finding, considering all options contracts in the sample are traded on 
the same hybrid market structure.  In addition, we also examine proportional effective spreads and 
find a weak result that only the time weighted proportional effective spread increases by 2.91% 
(significant at the 5% level) on insider trading days for the NYSE underlying stock options, which 
is inconsistent with H3.  Although all other effective spread measures exhibit no significant change 
for the NYSE or NASDAQ underlying stock options, in line with H3. 
 
These findings, even though puzzling initially may actually lend support to Cho and Engle’s (1998) 
proposed ‘derivative hedge theory’.  Kaul, Nimalendran, and Zhang (2004) also find evidence to 
support this theory in their study of informed trading and option spreads.  Cho and Engle (1998) 
reason that adverse selection arises in stock markets because a rational market maker interprets 
large orders as a signal of informed trading and adjusts the price and spread accordingly.  However, 
the bid-ask spread in derivative markets, and especially, in option markets may be determined not 
only by derivative market activity but also by activity in the underlying market. Therefore they 
propose that the derivative hedge theory explains the relationship between liquidity in the 
underlying market and hedge risk in the derivative markets.   
 
They argue that although the traditional source of liquidity in an options market is the market 
makers, the underlying market can also be a source of liquidity if it can be tapped through hedging.  
They explain that if the market maker in the derivative markets hedges all his position, then he will 
no longer be subject to either inventory or asymmetric information risk.   Therefore if the derivates 
market maker is able to perfectly hedge his position he will no longer be exposed to adverse 
selection.  Liquidity in the derivatives market will simply be a function of the liquidity in the 
underlying market, rather than the trading activity in the derivatives market. Thus, with the presence 
of informed trading in the underlying market, such as on the NYSE specialist system, the spreads 
will be wider in the underlying market leading to wider spreads on the counterpart derivatives 
contracts.  This is because the derivatives market spreads will arise as a consequence of derivative 
market makers finding it difficult to hedge their position because of an illiquid underlying market. 
 
Therefore it is likely the insignificant reaction in spread measures for NYSE underlying stock 
option contracts may be as a consequence of the higher spreads on the counterpart NYSE listed 
stocks.  Hence, the NYSE specialist’s ability to react to insider trading by way of widening spreads 
also somewhat influences the spreads on the options market, as in reality market makers would only 
be able to imperfectly hedge their positions (Cho and Engle, 1998).  Similarly the observed 
improvement of liquidity and narrowing of spreads for the NASDAQ listed stocks also translate to 
improved liquidity for the counterpart NASDAQ underlying stock option contracts. 
 
Overall, our results suggest that as hypothesised in H3, the hybrid market structure of the CBOE, 
AMEX, PCX, and PHLX is essentially fragmented like the NASDAQ dealer system as it fails to 
identify informed trading and consequently reduce liquidity on insider trading days, apart from the 
exception of a higher time weighted proportional effective spread for NYSE underlying stock 
options.  Hence the hybrid market structure offers greater trader anonymity in comparison to the 
NYSE specialist system.  This suggests that the monopolistic position of the NYSE specialist in 
addition to the knowledge of consolidated order flow is an important aspect of the traditional NYSE 
specialist system.  As a consequence the absence of these concessions for a specialist, as in the case 
of the DPM on the options markets, would limit their ability to react to informed trading.  Further, 
the differential effect of underlying stock markets on the reaction of market makers in stock option 
spreads suggest that changes in option contract spreads may arise from changes in the spreads of the 
underlying stocks, consistent with the derivative hedge theory. 
 
 
 
6.3 Multivariate Analysis 
 
It is widely documented that bid ask spreads are influenced by many factors (Schwartz, 1988; 
McInish and Wood, 1992).  These factors are, in their most basic form, trading activity, 
stock/contract price and volatility.  If these variables differ between the control period and insider 
trading day, a simple comparison of mean spreads will give a misleading picture of the impact of 
illegal insider trading on liquidity.  These variables are controlled for in the following regression 
models in Tables 9 to 11.  Specifically we fit cross-sectional regressions with trading activity 
variables, price volatility, and stock/contract price and a dummy variable to account for the effect of 
an insider trading day to analyse the multivariate effect of illegal insider trading on bid ask spreads. 
 
6.3.1 Equities Multivariate Analysis 
 
Table 9 reports the results for the estimated regressions for the NSYE and NASDAQ listed stock 
spreads.  We find that ln(Volume), sqrt(Trades), Risk, and sqrt(Price) are all significant 
determinants of spreads in almost all of  the models for the NYSE listed stocks.  Trading activity 
variables such as ln(Volume) and sqrt(Trades) are negatively related to spread measures, consistent 
with previous literature which suggests that higher trading activity reduces costs for market makers 
which translates into narrower spreads (Schwartz, 1988).  Table 9 also demonstrates that sqrt(Price) 
has a positive effect on all spread measures significant at the 1% level, with higher priced 
stocks/contracts having higher spreads, which is an unexpected result according to McInish and 
Wood (1992).  Furthermore we find that higher price volatility (Risk) is associated with higher 
spreads, and is observed to be the most important determinant of bid ask spreads on the NYSE.  
Higher price volatility seems to lead to an increase in all spread measures in the order of $0.45 to 
$1.186 for each percentage increase in the standard deviation of midpoint returns, all significant at 
the 1% level.  These results are consistent with the findings of previous literature (Petersen and 
Fialkowski, 1994).  However, interestingly we find that the Insider dummy variable is not 
significant in explaining the cross-sectional variation in any of the spread measures on the NYSE.  
Although it retains a positive sign in all the models, similar to our preliminary assessment of higher 
spreads on insider trading days in Table 7.  This is in contrast to the NASDAQ quoted spread 
models in which the Insider dummy displays a negative impact on bid ask spreads, but again 
remains insignificant. 
 
Further, for NASDAQ listed stocks, Table 9 illustrates that there are mixed results for the 
determinants of bid ask spreads, depending on whether we are examining effective or quoted 
spreads and their time weighted counterparts.  For quoted spread measures, trading activity 
variables such as ln(Volume) and sqrt(Trades) retain their negative values and significance, in line 
with the findings on the NYSE and previous literature.  In addition, price volatility (Risk) is 
estimated to have a positive effect of $0.06 to $0.08, significant at the 1% level, on quoted spreads, 
but not its time weighted counterpart.  Also similar to NYSE listed stocks, we find that higher 
priced stocks have a significant and positive effect on quoted spreads and its time weighted 
counterpart.   
 
Closer examination of effective spread and time weighted effective spread regressions for 
NASDAQ listed stocks reveal that ln(Volume) and sqrt(Trades) have the expected negative impact 
on effective spreads of $0.006 and $0.001, respectively for each unit increase in the variables.  
However, the very same variables are estimated to have a significant positive impact on time 
weighted effective spreads, where ln(Volume) leads to a $0.033 increase (significant at the 20% 
level) and sqrt(Trades) leads to a $0.002 increase (significant at the 15% level) in Model 7 and 
Model 8, respectively.  This result is unexpected in light of previous literature and findings.  
Though it must be noted that the time weighted effective spread models (Models 7 and 8) explain 
less than 16% of the cross-sectional variation in the spreads.   
 
Table 9 – Equities Regression Results 
This table reports coefficient estimates for several regression specifications on spread measures using daily averages of the variables on the insider trading day and the control period (the day prior to 
the insider trading day). The regressions contain the following dependant variables: Quoted Spread, Time-Weighted Quoted Spread, Effective Spread, and Time-Weighted Effective Spread.  The 
regressions also contain the following explanatory variables.  Ln(Volume) is equal to the natural logarithm of the total number of shares traded on that day.  Sqrt(Trades) is equal to the square root of 
the total number of transactions on that day.  Risk is calculated as the standard deviation of percentage changes in quoted midpoints of the stock on that day.  Sqrt(Price) is equal to the square root of 
the average midpoint on that day.  Insider is a dummy variable which takes on the value of 1, if the day is an insider trading day.  The White (1980) method is used to correct for heteroscedasticity.  
The P-values are reported in parentheses below each estimated coefficient.  
 
 
Intercept 0.009 ‐0.031 ‐0.033 ‐0.037 ‐0.043 ‐0.052 0.006 ‐0.031 0.279 0.075 ‐0.027 ‐0.755 0.131 0.057 ‐0.462 ‐0.117
(0.928) (0.365) (0.816) (0.394) (0.476) (0.034)**** (0.926) (0.142)** (0.000)***** (0.002)***** (0.949) (0.000)***** (0.009)***** (0.038)**** (0.062)*** (0.210)
ln(Volume) ‐0.012 ‐0.009 ‐0.004 ‐0.007 ‐0.019 ‐0.067 ‐0.006 0.033
(0.117)** (0.334) (0.291) (0.087)*** (0.000)***** (0.122)** (0.143)** (0.164)*
Sqrt(Trades) ‐0.003 ‐0.003 ‐0.001 ‐0.001 ‐0.002 ‐0.006 ‐0.001 0.002
(0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.001)***** (0.000)***** (0.001)***** (0.038)**** (0.030)**** (0.100)**
Risk 1.186 0.587 1.124 0.497 0.836 0.599 0.701 0.450 0.080 0.060 0.273 0.196 0.067 0.053 0.180 0.205
(0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.001)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.224) (0.344) (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.326) (0.264)
Sqrt(Price) 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.029 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.008 0.012 0.243 0.262 ‐0.003 0.004 0.029 0.029
(0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.072)*** (0.037)**** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.545) (0.554) (0.123)** (0.161)*
Insider 0.000 0.009 0.007 0.017 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.007 ‐0.001 ‐0.002 ‐0.020 ‐0.016 0.006 0.007 0.044 0.045
(0.997) (0.399) (0.684) (0.264) (0.948) (0.545) (0.664) (0.312) (0.939) (0.996) (0.824) (0.857) (0.591) (0.474) (0.349) (0.358)
R_2 0.714 0.862 0.573 0.708 0.776 0.834 0.731 0.810 0.269 0.350 0.375 0.391 0.158 0.236 0.152 0.148
Adj_R_2 0.669 0.839 0.505 0.661 0.740 0.807 0.688 0.780 0.214 0.301 0.328 0.345 0.095 0.178 0.088 0.084
F‐test (p‐value) (0.349) (0.048)**** (0.59) (0.117)** (0.213) (0.006)***** (0.025)**** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.066)*** (0.066)*** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)*****
Quoted Spread Time Weighted Quoted 
Spread
Effective Spread Time Weighted Effective 
Spread
n=30 n=58
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
NYSE NASDAQ
Quoted Spread Time Weighted Quoted 
Spread
Effective Spread Time Weighted Effective 
Spread
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8Model 8 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
* - denotes significance at the 20% level
**- denotes significance at the 15% level
***- denotes significance at the 10% level
****- denotes significance at the 5% level
*****- denotes significance at the 1% level  
In addition, it seems that sqrt(Price) has no significant effect on effective spreads (Model 5), while 
retaining significance and a positive sign in the time weighted effective spread models (Model 6).  
Again, Models 5 and 6 for NASDAQ listed stocks explain less than 24 percent of the cross-
sectional variation in effective spreads.   
 
Examining the Insider dummy variable, although insignificant in all models, it retains a negative 
sign for all quoted spread measures and a positive sign for effective spread measures for NASDAQ 
listed stocks.  This is consistent with the findings in our preliminary analysis which highlighted that 
quoted spread measures narrowed on insider trading days, while there was an insignificant positive 
change in effective spreads. 
 
In summary, after controlling for trading activity, price volatility, and stock price, the Insider 
dummy variable exhibits an insignificant effect on bid ask spreads for all models, both NYSE and 
NASDAQ listed.  These results suggest that higher spreads on the NYSE on insider trading days 
and narrowing spreads on NASDAQ may have been in reaction to changes in trading activity, risk 
or stock prices.  However, the changes in trading activity, risk and stock prices may have occurred 
as consequence of the informed trading by illegal insiders.  Therefore, as suggested by Meulbroek 
(1992), it may actually be the unique trade characteristics of informed trades that may lead to the 
observed changes in bid ask spreads by market makers on insider trading days.  Similarly, Glosten 
and Milgrom (1985) develop a  model that deals with how spreads respond to market-generated 
information, as they perceive that orders themselves can signal and convey information that affect 
market maker quotations. 
 
Alternatively, it may also be argued that although the Insider variable retained the correct signs, it 
may have been found to be insignificant because of poor choice of statistical power and size in the 
testing of the variables considering the small sample sizes.  Another issue that may affect the 
significance of our Insider dummy variable may be the fact that we have failed to control for market 
maker spread adjustments to order imbalance.  There is evidence to suggest that signed order 
imbalances affect bid ask spreads (Chordia et al, 2002), as this is seen to move market makers from 
their desired inventory positions, and therefore a spread revision occurs in order to return to optimal 
inventory position.  In their study of the impact of illegal insider trading in specialist and dealer 
markets, Fishe and Robe (2004) do not find significant results for their similarly constructed 
‘Insider Period’ dummy variable until they net out the effect of order imbalance.  Hence, our failure 
to control for this important aspect of quote adjustments in market maker mediated markets may 
possibly hinder our estimated results. 
 
 
6.3.2 Options Multivariate Analysis 
 
Table 10 illustrates the regression estimates for the NYSE and NASDAQ underlying stock option 
contracts.  It appears that ln(Volume) and sqrt(Trades) are only significant in explaining the cross-
sectional variation in quoted spread measures for NYSE underlying stock options (Models 1-4), 
where both the regressors are estimated to have a negative impact on spreads.  However, Model 7 
suggests that ln(Volume) has a positive impact on time weighted effective spreads of $0.027 
(significant at the 10% level) per unit increase in ln(Volume).  This is a surprising result in light of 
previous literature which predicts that increased volume leads to reduced costs for market makers 
which translate into narrower bid ask spreads.  However, it may be a possibility that even though 
quoted spreads improve for NYSE underlying stock options, market makers move to reduce price 
improvement (and increase effective spreads) as they are unsure of the informational content of the 
increased volume. 
 
 
Table 10 – Options Regression Results 1 
This table reports coefficient estimates for several regression specifications on spread measures using daily averages of the variables on the insider trading day and the control period (the day prior to 
the insider trading day). The regressions contain the following dependant variables: Quoted Spread, Time-Weighted Quoted Spread, Effective Spread, and Time-Weighted Effective Spread.  The 
regressions also contain the following explanatory variables.  Ln(Volume) is equal to the natural logarithm of the total number of option contracts traded on that day.  Sqrt(Trades) is equal to the 
square root of the total number of transactions on that day.  Risk is calculated as the standard deviation of percentage changes in quoted midpoints of the options contract on that day.  Sqrt(Price) is 
equal to the square root of the average midpoint on that day.  Insider is a dummy variable which takes on the value of 1, if the day is an insider trading day.  The White (1980) method is used to 
correct for heteroscedasticity.  The P-values are reported in parentheses below each estimated coefficient. Note matched pair options observations are lost due to some control days having zero 
volume, and hence the log of these values yielded undefined values and were not included in the regression analysis. 
Intercept 0.029 0.033 0.058 0.051 ‐0.182 ‐0.013 ‐0.198 ‐0.067 0.156 0.074 0.133 0.061 0.179 0.090 0.040 0.038
(0.551) (0.343) (0.305) (0.176)* (0.174)* (0.868) (0.075)*** (0.451) (0.000)***** (0.006)***** (0.005)***** (0.038)**** (0.034)**** (0.089)*** (0.559) (0.394)
ln(Volume) ‐0.013 ‐0.016 0.023 0.027 ‐0.020 ‐0.020 ‐0.021 ‐0.002
(0.021)**** (0.012)**** (0.255) (0.059)*** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.011)**** (0.712)
Sqrt(Trades) ‐0.019 ‐0.022 ‐0.009 0.006 ‐0.009 ‐0.009 ‐0.008 ‐0.001
(0.016)**** (0.006)***** (0.466) (0.642) (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.004)***** (0.429)
Risk 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.011 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.004
(0.004)***** (0.001)***** (0.006)***** (0.003)***** (0.009)***** (0.051)*** (0.092)*** (0.223) (0.002)***** (0.000)***** (0.001)***** (0.000)***** (0.567) (0.312) (0.294) (0.265)
Sqrt(Price) 0.158 0.149 0.151 0.143 0.137 0.115 0.094 0.079 0.080 0.090 0.091 0.098 0.047 0.055 0.046 0.045
(0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.002)***** (0.019)**** (0.001)***** (0.02)**** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.142)** (0.075)*** (0.149)** (0.130)**
Insider 0.001 0.022 ‐0.001 0.016 0.009 0.030 0.035 0.048 0.012 0.014 0.008 0.009 0.003 0.007 0.009 0.010
(0.954) (0.274) (0.955) (0.485) (0.835) (0.537) (0.359) (0.256) (0.305) (0.231) (0.504) (0.430) (0.888) (0.755) (0.600) (0.585)
R_2 0.820 0.818 0.790 0.792 0.419 0.380 0.329 0.250 0.714 0.671 0.704 0.674 0.300 0.264 0.103 0.106
Adj_R_2 0.784 0.789 0.748 0.759 0.303 0.256 0.195 0.100 0.689 0.645 0.678 0.649 0.238 0.199 0.023 0.027
F‐test (p‐value) (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)*****
Quoted Spread Time Weighted Quoted 
Spread
Effective Spread Time Weighted Effective 
Spread
Quoted Spread
Model 7 Model 8
NASDAQ UNDERLYING
n=50
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6Model 1
Time Weighted Quoted 
Spread
Effective Spread Time Weighted Effective 
Spread
****- denotes significance at the 5% level
*****- denotes significance at the 1% level
n=25
NYSE UNDERLYING
* - denotes significance at the 20% level
**- denotes significance at the 15% level
***- denotes significance at the 10% level
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
 
In line with previous literature we find that Risk and sqrt(Price) are important significant 
explanatory variables in almost all of the models for NYSE underlying stock options apart from 
Model 8 where Risk only approaches marginal significance considering the small sample size.  
Additionally, both Risk and sqrt(Price) are estimated to have a positive impact on NYSE underlying 
stock option spreads.  Table 10 highlights that the greatest determinant of NYSE underlying stock 
option spreads is sqrt(Price) with a positive effect on all spread measures in the range of $0.079 to 
$0.158 for each unit increase in sqrt(Price).  Similar to the equities regression estimates, after 
controlling for trading activity, risk, and contract price the Insider dummy variable remains 
insignificant in explaining the variation in NYSE underlying stock option spreads, although it 
retains its positive sign.  
 
For NASDAQ underlying stock options, we find similar results for the quoted spread measures 
consistent with the findings for NYSE underlying stock option spreads.  However, for NASDAQ 
underlying stock option effective spreads we find that the estimated regression models fail to 
explain more than 30 percent of the cross-sectional variation.  The results indicate that sqrt(Price) 
remains a significant explanatory variable in the models for both effective spreads and its time 
weighted counterpart, and also the main determinant of spreads with a positive impact ranging from 
$0.045 to $0.055 for each unit increase in sqrt(Price).  Furthermore, we find that ln(Volume) and 
sqrt(Trades) is only significant in explaining the cross-sectional variation in effective spreads, with 
a negative effect in both Models 5 and 6.  We fail to identify any other significant variables in 
Models 5 – 6 for NASDAQ underlying stock options, including the Insider dummy variable which 
still retains a positive sign.  Models 7 and 8 for time weighted effective spreads of NASDAQ 
underlying stock options suggest that the only significant explanatory variable is sqrt(Price), which 
has a positive impact ranging from $0.045 to $0.046 (both significant at the 15% level).  Yet again 
the Insider dummy variable is estimated to be positive, but remains insignificant. 
 Although the findings in Table 10 provide evidence on the main determinants of bid ask spread 
measures for stock options, they fail to explain the differential impact of the underlying stock 
market on market maker reaction to insider trading on stock option spreads.  Unsatisfied with the 
results derived from Table 10, we more closely inspect option market spreads by investigating the 
validity of the derivative hedge theory explanation to our basic results. 
 
Cho and Engle’s (1998) derivative hedge theory suggests that option market spreads should be 
positively related to the underlying stock spreads.  This is because in a perfect hedge world, options 
spreads would arise from the illiquidity of the underlying market, rather than from inventory risk or 
informed trading in the option market itself.  Further, option market volume and other trading 
activity variables should be insignificant determinants of option market spreads.  To test these 
propositions we add the quoted and time weighted quoted spreads of the underlying stocks as 
additional regressors in our specified regression models.  Specifically, we add the time weighted 
underlying stock quoted spread as a regressor if the dependent variable is a time weighted spread 
measure, otherwise we add the underlying quoted spread.  We use the underlying quoted spread 
measures as we are interested in examining the spreads that options market makers would encounter 
on the stock market when they attempt to hedge, and hence quoted spread measures would be the 
best indicator. 
Table 11 – Options Regression Results 2 
This table reports coefficient estimates for several regression specifications on spread measures using daily averages of the variables on the insider trading day and the control period (the day prior to the insider trading 
day). The regressions contain the following dependant variables: Quoted Spread, Time-Weighted Quoted Spread, Effective Spread, and Time-Weighted Effective Spread.  The regressions also contain the following 
explanatory variables.  Ln(Volume) is equal to the natural logarithm of the total number of option contracts traded on that day.  Sqrt(Trades) is equal to the square root of the total number of transactions on that day.  
Risk is calculated as the standard deviation of percentage changes in quoted midpoints of the options contract on that day.  Sqrt(Price) is equal to the square root of the average midpoint on that day.  U_Quoted_sprd 
and U_TW_Quoted_sprd are the Quoted and Time-Weighted Quoted spread, respectively, of the underlying stock.  Insider is a dummy variable which takes on the value of 1, if the day is an insider trading day.  The 
White (1980) method is used to correct for heteroscedasticity.  The P-values are reported in parentheses below each estimated coefficient. Note matched pair options observations are lost due to some control days 
having zero volume, and hence the log of these values yielded undefined values and were not included in the regression analysis. 
Intercept 0.014 0.015 0.064 0.042 ‐0.202 ‐0.044 ‐0.190 ‐0.087 0.101 0.050 0.083 0.025 0.124 0.052 ‐0.001 0.021
(0.734) (0.621) (0.144)** (0.171)* (0.066)*** (0.536) (0.060)*** (0.267) (0.033)**** (0.041)**** (0.094)*** (0.386) (0.193)* (0.332) (0.988) (0.582)
ln(Volume) ‐0.007 ‐0.014 0.031 0.031 ‐0.016 ‐0.015 ‐0.164 0.002
(0.285) (0.055)*** (0.104)** (0.017)**** (0.001)***** (0.001)***** (0.075)*** (0.788)
Sqrt(Trades) ‐0.012 ‐0.016 0.004 0.018 ‐0.008 ‐0.007 ‐0.007 ‐0.001
(0.106)** (0.035)**** (0.770) (0.166)* (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.021)**** (0.736)
Risk 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.009 0.009 0.013 0.014 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.005
(0.183)* (0.050)*** (0.258) (0.117)** (0.509) (0.707) (0.778) (0.909) (0.002)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.739) (0.657) (0.132)** (0.141)**
Sqrt(Price) 0.133 0.132 0.123 0.124 0.102 0.090 0.056 0.047 0.076 0.081 0.095 0.105 0.043 0.045 0.049 0.045
(0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.010)***** (0.037)**** (0.089)*** (0.188)* (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.176)* (0.146)** (0.109)** (0.117)**
U_Quoted_sprd 0.570 0.495 0.802 0.661 0.395 0.400 0.395 0.517
(0.005)***** (0.003)***** (0.035)**** (0.063)*** (0.038)**** (0.009)***** (0.232) (0.076)***
U_TW_Quoted_sprd 0.530 0.471 0.697 0.718 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.006
(0.001)***** (0.001)***** (0.019)**** (0.015)**** (0.006)***** (0.000)***** (0.227) (0.274)
Insider ‐0.003 0.010 ‐0.008 0.002 0.003 0.020 0.027 0.032 0.013 0.014 0.010 0.010 0.005 0.008 0.010 0.010
(0.890) (0.595) (0.712) (0.930) (0.929) (0.665) (0.408) (0.375) (0.198)* (0.209) (0.403) (0.386) (0.824) (0.702) (0.543) (0.556)
R_2 0.872 0.868 0.853 0.849 0.509 0.436 0.459 0.378 0.755 0.721 0.732 0.718 0.331 0.323 0.132 0.131
Adj_R_2 0.839 0.840 0.815 0.818 0.380 0.287 0.317 0.214 0.728 0.693 0.702 0.690 0.255 0.246 0.033 0.033
F‐test (p‐value) (0.137)** (0.028)**** (0.050)**** (0.010)***** (0.887) (0.637) (0.550) (0.602) (0.001)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.000)***** (0.05)**** (0.105)** (0.000)***** (0.000)*****
NYSE UNDERLYING NASDAQ UNDERLYING
Quoted Spread Time Weighted Quoted 
Spread
Effective Spread Time Weighted Effective 
Spread
Quoted Spread Time Weighted Quoted 
Spread
Effective Spread Time Weighted Effective 
Spread
Model 8
n=25 n=50
* - denotes significance at the 20% level
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 1Variable Model 1
**- denotes significance at the 15% level
***- denotes significance at the 10% level
****- denotes significance at the 5% level
*****- denotes significance at the 1% level
Model 7Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
 
Table 11 demonstrates that after controlling for the effects of trading activity, risk, and 
contract price, the underlying stock spread variables (U_Quoted_sprd and 
U_TW_Quoted_sprd) are found to be highly significant (ranging from significance at the 
10% to 1% levels) and the main determinant of option spreads for both NYSE and NASDAQ 
underlying stock spreads.  Although U_Quoted_sprd and U_TW_Quoted_sprd are not 
significant in Models 5 and 8 for NASDAQ underlying stock options, they nevertheless 
approach marginal significance.  Table 11 further demonstrates that the Insider dummy 
variable is estimated as insignificant in all models except for quoted bid ask spreads for 
NASDAQ underlying stock options.  The Insider dummy variable is estimated to have a 
$0.013 positive impact (significant at the 20% level) in Model 1 and a $0.014 positive impact 
in Model 2 (where it approaches marginal significance) for NASDAQ underlying stock 
options.  This suggests that having controlled for trading activity, risk, contract price, and the 
underlying stock spread, the day of trading being an insider trading day has an overall upward 
effect on quoted spreads for the NASDAQ underlying stock options.  This is inconsistent 
with H3, which may suggest that the hybrid structure can actually identify the presence of 
informed trading on insider trading days, separate from other variables, and revise quoted 
spreads upwards.  However, this result is constrained to only quoted spreads for NASDAQ 
underlying stock options, whereas the Insider dummy variable remains highly insignificant in 
all other models. 
 
Most importantly, Table 11 demonstrates that overall the main determinant of option spreads 
appears to be the underlying stock spreads, which support our proposition of the derivative 
hedge theory.  But, our results suggest that option market makers are not able to perfectly 
hedge their positions in the underlying stock market, as we find that trading activity variables 
such as ln(Volume) and sqrt(Trades) remain significant determinants of bid ask spreads in the 
majority of the models.  Therefore we conclude that the option market maker is able to only 
imperfectly hedge his positions in the underlying stock market, consistent with the findings of 
Cho and Engle (1998). 
 
 
6.4 Limitations 
 
6.4.1 Liquidity Measures 
 
In this study we use bid ask spread measures as a proxy for liquidity.  However, Lee et al. 
(1993), Kavajecz (1998), and Dupont (200) argue that dealers also adjust depth in response to 
informed trading.  This is also supported by Fishe and Robe’s (2004) study which finds that 
market makers on the NSYE also actively manage depth in order to protect themselves 
against adverse selection risk.  Therefore, our conclusions regarding overall liquidity in each 
market may be somewhat limited as we have not accounted for revisions in market maker 
quoted depths. 
 
6.4.2 Order Imbalance 
 
There is evidence to suggest that signed order imbalances affect bid-ask spreads (Chordia et 
al, 2002), as this is seen to move market makers from their desired  inventory positions, and 
therefore a spread revision occurs in order to return to optimal inventory position.  Therefore 
by netting out the effects of order imbalance stipulated by inventory models (Stoll, 1978; 
Amihud and Mendelson, 1980; and Ho and Stoll, 1981), one would be able to isolate the bid-
ask spread effects of the informed trading due to adverse selection costs.  Therefore the 
failure to control for this important aspect of quote revision by market makers may have 
affected the robustness of our results regarding insider trading in the multivariate regression 
models. 
 6.4.3 Comparison of Market Structures 
 
As we are examining the differential impact of illegal insider trading on liquidity in three 
different market structures, it is necessary to control for the fact that firms listed on one 
market may systematically differ from firms listed on the other in terms of their 
characteristics (assuming that these characteristics affect the market maker's reaction to 
insider trading).  However, considering the small sample size it is impossible to match firms 
across the exchanges.  But it may be assumed that since we use a cross-section of firms this 
may go towards eliminating the bias caused by the different individual characteristics of the 
firms on each exchange. 
 
6.4.4 Unbundling Liquidity Providers 
 
Since the transactions and quote data made available does not specify who is trading, we 
cannot separate liquidity providers into market makers and limit order traders.  Therefore we 
cannot specifically imply from the results exactly which group is adjusting to informed 
trades.  Informed trading could exhaust all inside limit orders on the limit order book before 
market makers are left quoting their own prices.  Hence in some instances there may actually 
be no market maker bid ask quote revisions, however, depth will certainly decrease.  
Although we cannot completely rule out this possibility, a comparison of dealer and specialist 
dominated markets make it less likely. 
 
6.4.5 Sample Selection Bias 
 
If the insider trading cases were all discovered on the basis of price and volume movements, 
then findings based on such cases would tend to overstate the effects of overall insider 
trading on bid-ask spreads.  As the basis of our data collection and database are similar to that 
of Meulbroek (1992), we may rely upon her finding that upon testing for sample selection 
bias using the source of detection information as a proxy for whether the case could have 
originated from a volume or price change referral or not, she finds no evidence of detection 
bias. 
 CHAPTER 7 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This dissertation examines the differential impact of illegal insider trading on liquidity in 
specialist, dealer, and hybrid market structures.  Previous empirical studies have found 
conflicting evidence when examining the impact of insider trading on liquidity on the NYSE 
specialist and NASDAQ dealer systems.  However, theoretical literature suggests that the 
traditional NYSE specialist system is more effective in identifying informed trading and 
reducing adverse selection risk in comparison to the NASDAQ dealer system.  Further, there 
is no existing literature that examines the impact of informed trading on liquidity in the 
hybrid market structure of the CBOE, PCX, AMEX, and PHLX options markets.  This study 
is the first to analyse illegal insider trading and its impact on liquidity in a cross-sectional 
framework, with illegal insider trades that span from 1998 to 2007.  It is also the first study to 
examine the impact of illegal insider trading on the liquidity of option contracts, in addition 
to investigating the relationship between informed trading in the options and underlying stock 
of a company.  To examine the impact of illegal insider trading on liquidity, we compare bid 
ask spreads on insider trading days to a control period. 
 
Results indicate that in line with Fishe and Robe (2004), bid ask spreads are greater on the 
NYSE on insider trading days, but narrower or unchanged on NASDAQ.  This evidence is 
also consistent with trader anonymity literature (Garfinkel and Nimalendran, 2003; Heidle 
and Huang, 1999) that suggests that the specialist system is more transparent or less 
anonymous than the competitive dealer system.  However, our cross-sectional regressions 
reveal that it is the trade characteristics of the informed trades which signal and convey 
information to the market maker on the NYSE, consequently leading to a reduction in 
liquidity.  These findings lend support to previous literature (Benveniste, Marcus, and 
Wilhelm, 1992; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Leach and Madhavan, 1993) that imply that the 
NYSE specialist’s privileged monopolistic position and complete knowledge of order flow 
allows for the identification of informed trading. 
 
In addition we also find evidence that paired option trades of NASDAQ underlying stocks 
experience an improvement in liquidity (lower bid ask spreads), while NYSE underlying 
stock options experience no significant change.  These findings suggest that the hybrid 
market structure is in fact fragmented like the NASDAQ dealer system and offers greater 
trader anonymity than the traditional NYSE specialist system.  Although the differential 
effect of the underlying stock listing on the impact of illegal insider trading on options 
liquidity remains unexplained.  However, through further inspection in our cross-sectional 
regressions, we find that the main determinant of option spreads is the quoted spreads of the 
underlying stocks, which lend further support to Cho and Engle’s (1998) derivative hedge 
theory. 
 
This dissertation provides a number of future avenues for research.  This study could be 
extended by employing a different methodology to that which has already been applied such 
as intraday investigations in changes in bid ask spreads due to insider trading.  Additionally, 
more rigorous extrapolation of information regarding illegal insider trades may lead to a 
greater sample size allowing for more robust investigations of liquidity effects.  Most 
importantly, an extension to this study could aim to control for market maker reaction to 
order imbalance, similar to Fishe and Robe (2004), and also examine changes in quoted depth 
measures around insider trading.  This would provide a more complete understanding of the 
aggregate impact of illegal insider trading on market liquidity. 
 Furthermore, our results regarding the effect of underlying stock spreads in explaining the 
variation of stock options spreads opens up an yet to be explored area of market 
microstructure research.  Therefore, ideally, future studies can further investigate the role of 
underlying stock spreads on option spreads by examining the impact of underlying stock 
spreads on spreads in options markets when there has been insider trading on the options but 
not on the underlying stock, or vice versa. This dissertation in fact paves the way for further 
research into the validity of the derivative hedge theory using illegal insider trading cases as a 
proxy for informed trading or adverse selection risk. 
 REFERENCES 
 
Abhyankar, A., D. Ghosh, E. Levin, and R.J. Limmack, 1997, Bid Ask Spreads, Trading 
Volume, and Volatility: Intra-Day Evidence from the London Stock Exchange, Journal of 
Business Finance and Accounting 24, 343-362. 
 
Anand, Amber, and Daniel G. Weaver, 2001, The Value of the specialist: Empirical evidence 
from the CBOE, Journal of Financial Markets 9, 100-118. 
 
Barclay, Michael J. and Jerold B. Warner, 1993, Stealth trading and volatility, Journal of 
Financial Economics 34, 281-305. 
 
Battalio, R.,  A. Ellul, and R. Jennings, 2007, Reputation Effects in Trading on the New York 
Stock Exchange, The Journal of Finance 62, 1243. 
 
Benston, George J. and Robert L. Hagerman, 1974, Determinants of bid-asked spreads in the 
over-the-counter market, Journal of Financial Economics 1, 353-364. 
 
Benveniste, L., A. Marcus, and W. Wilhelm, 1992, What’s so special about the specialist?, 
Journal of Financial Economics 32, 61–86. 
 
Boehmer, E., J. Grammig, and E. Theissen, 2007, Estimating the probability of informed 
trading—does trade misclassification matter?, Journal of Financial Markets 10, 26-47. 
 
Brooks, Raymond, M., and Ajay Patel, and Tie Su, 2003, How the Equity Market Responds 
to Unanticipated Events, Journal of Business 76, 109-133. 
 
Cao, C., L.C. Field, and G.R. Hanka, 2004, Does Insider Trading Impair Market Liquidity? 
Evidence from IPO Lockup Expirations, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 39, 
25-46. 
 
Chakravarty, Sugato, 2001, Stealth Trading: Which Traders' Trades Move Stock Prices?, 
Journal of Financial Economics 61, 289-307. 
 
Chakravarty, S., McConnell, J.J, 1999, Does insider trading really move stock prices?, 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 34, 191–209. 
 
Chan,Y., and M.Weinstein, 1993, Reputation, bid-ask spread and market structure, Financial 
Analysts Journal 49, 57–62. 
 
Chiang, R. And P. C. Venkatesh, 1988, Insider holdings and perceptions of information 
asymmetry: A note, Journal of Finance 43, 1041-49. 
 
Chordia, T., Roll, R., Subrahmanyam, A., 2002, Order imbalance, liquidity, and market 
returns, Journal of Financial Economics 65, 111–130. 
 
Copeland, Thomas E. and Dan Galai, 1983, Information effects on the bid-ask spread, 
Journal of Finance 38, 1457-1469.  
 
Cornell, B., Sirri, E.R., 1992, The reaction of investors and stock prices to insider trading,  
Journal of Finance 47, 1031–1059. 
 
Demsetz, Harold, 1968, The cost of transacting, Quarterly Journal of Economics 82, 33-53. 
 
Dupont, D., 2000, Market making, prices, and quantity limits, Review of Financial Studies 
13, 1129–1151. 
 
Easley, D., and M. O'Hara, 1987, Price trade size, and information in securities markets, 
Journal of Financial Economics 19, 69-90.  
 
Economides, N., Schwartz, R., 1995, Equity trading practices and market structure: assessing 
asset managers’ demand for immediacy, Stern School of Business, New York University, 
Working Paper. 
 
Ferguson, M.F. and S.C. Mann, 2001, Execution costs and their intraday variation in futures 
markets, Journal of Business 74, 125–160. 
 
Fishe, R and M Robe, 2004, The impact of illegal insider trading in dealer and specialist 
markets: evidence from a natural experiment, Journal of Financial Economics 71, 461-488. 
 
French, Kenneth R and Richard Roll, 1986, Stock return variances: The arrival of information 
and the reaction of traders, Journal of Financial Economics 17, 5-26. 
 
Garfinkel, J.A., and M. Nimalendran, 2003, Market Structure and Trader Anonymity: An 
Analysis of Insider Trading, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38, 591-610. 
 
George, T., G. Kaul, and M. Nimalcndran, 1991, Estimation of the Bid-Ask Spread and its 
Components: A New Approach, Review of Financial Studies 4, 623-656. 
 
Gleason, K, 2007, Does market maker competition affect the response to insider trading?, 
Applied Financial Economics 17, 691 – 700. 
 
Glosten, Lawrence R. and Paul R. Milgrom, 1985, Bid, ask and transaction prices in a 
specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders, Journal of Financial Economics 14, 
71-100.  
 
Glosten, L. and L. Harris, 1988, Estimating the Components of the Bid/Ask Spread,  Journal 
of Financial Economics 21, 123-142. 
 
Glosten, L., 1989, Insider Trading, Liquidity and the Role of the Monopoly Specialist, 
Journal of Business 62, 211-235. 
 
Grammig, J., D. Schiereck, and E. Theissen, 2001, Knowing me, knowing you: Trader 
anonymity and informed trading in parallel markets, Journal of Financial Markets 4, 385–
412. 
 
Grossman, S, 1976, On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets Where Trades Have 
Diverse information, Journal of Finance 31, 573-585. 
 Grossman, S., and J, Stiglitz, 1980, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient 
Markets, American Economic Review 70, 393-408. 
 
Hasbrouck, J., Sofianos, G., 1993, The trades of market makers: an empirical analysis of 
NYSE specialists, Journal of Finance 48, 1565-1594. 
 
Heidle, Hans, Huang, Roger D., 2002, Information-based trading in dealer and auction 
markets: An analysis of exchange listings, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 37, 
391–424. 
 
Kavajecz, K.A., 1998, A specialist’s quoted depth as a strategic choice variable, University of 
Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Working Paper. 
 
Kini, Omesh,. and Mian, Shehzad., 1995, Bid-Ask Spread and Ownership Structure, Journal 
of Financial Research 18, 401-415. 
 
Kofman, P., and J.T. Moser, 1997, Spreads, information flows and transparency across 
trading systems, Applied Financial Economics, 7, 281-294. 
 
Kyle, A., 1985, Continuous auctions and insider trading, Econometrica 53, 1315–1335. 
 
Leach, J Chris and Madhavan, Ananth N, 1993, Price Experimentation and Security Market 
Structure, Review of Financial Studies 6, 375-404. 
 
Lee, C., Ready, M., 1991, Inferring trade direction from intraday data, Journal of Finance 41, 
733–746. 
 
Lee, C., Mucklow, B., Ready, M., 1993, Spreads, depths and the impact of earnings 
information: an intraday analysis, Review of Financial Studies 6, 345–374. 
 
Lee, J, Yi, C,H, 2001, Trade Size and Information-Motivated Trading in the Options and 
Stock Markets,  Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 36, 485-501. 
 
Mayhew, S., 2002, Competition, market structure and bid-ask spreads in stock options 
markets, Journal of Finance 57, 931–958. 
 
McInish, Thomas H. and Robert A. Wood, 1992, An analysis of bid/ask spreads for 
NYSE stocks, The Journal of Finance 47, 753-764. 
 
Meulbroek, L.K., 1992, An empirical analysis of illegal insider trading, Journal of Finance 
47, 1661–1699. 
 
Neal, R., 1992, A comparison of transaction costs between competitive market maker and 
specialist market structures, Journal of Business 65, 317–334. 
 
Pagano, M., and A. Roell, 1992, Auction and dealership markets: What is the difference?, 
European Economic Review 36, 613–623. 
 
Pagano, M. and Roell, A., 1996, Transparency and liquidity: a comparison of auction and 
dealer markets with informed trading, Journal of Finance 2, 580–611. 
 
Petersen, M., and D. Fialkowski, 1994, Posted versus Effective Spreads: Good Prices or Bad 
Quotes?, Journal of Financial Economics 35, 269-292. 
 
Rindi, B, 2008, Informed Traders as Liquidity Providers: Anonymity, Liquidity and Price 
Formation, Review of Finance 12, 497-532. 
 
Saar, G., 2001, Investor uncertainty and order flow information, New York University, 
Working Paper. 
 
Sarin, A., Shastri, K.A., Shastri, K.,1999, Ownership Structure and Stock Market Liquidity, 
University of Pittsburgh, Working Paper. 
 
Schwartz, Robert A., 1988, Equity Markets (Harper and Row, New York). 
 
Schwartz, R., Steil, B., 1996, Equity trading III: institutional investor trading practices and 
preferences. In: Steil, B., et al. (Eds.), The European Equity Markets. Brookings Institution, 
London. 
 
Stoll, H., 1978, The Supply of Dealer Services in Securities Markets, The Journal of Finance 
33, 1133-1151. 
 
Theissen, E., 2000, Trader anonymity, price formation and liquidity, Groupe HEC, Working 
Paper. 
 
Tinic, Seha M., 1972, The economics of liquidity services, Quarterly Journal of Economics 
86, 79-93. 
 
Venkataraman, K., and A.C. Waisburd, 2007, The Value of a Designated Market Maker, 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 42, 735–758. 
 
Venkatesh, P., 1992, Empirical evidence on the impact of the bid-ask spread on the 
characteristics of CRSP daily returns, Journal of Financial Research 15, 113-125. 
 
Waisburd, A.C., 2003, Anonymity and liquidity: evidence from the Paris Bourse, Neeley 
School of Business, Texas Christian University, Working Paper. 
 
